

CHAPTER 2

FACING THE 21ST CENTURY: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, CONTINUING PROBLEMS

David Coleman

Introduction: trends and concepts of the 1990s

We are now four years into the 21st century and the demographic patterns in the UNECE area, and the problems and opportunities that they present, have become if anything even more incoherent than they were around 1990. Some issues remain as they were then: continuing demographic marginalisation on the world scene, persistent low fertility, generally high and improving levels of survival, continuing immigration pressure, demographic divergence (Coleman, 2002a). There have also been radical changes, some failures of hopes and expectations, and some substantial realignment of demographic perceptions, definitions and policies affecting population.

The demographic responses to the collapse of communist regimes at the beginning of the 1990s have been profound. International migration now dominates European population dynamics. The significance of population ageing, long understood by demographers, has finally burst into the political and public consciousness, provoking much alarm, despondency and media hype. The conceptual world of demography has also been transformed. The idea of the 'Second Demographic Transition' - in which the rise of individualistic behaviour has led to the radical retreat of marriage in the face of new 'living arrangements' - has promoted research along new lines, facilitated by advances in the technical analysis of the life-course and in many other areas. In this paper only a selection of these interesting developments can be considered. There is, for example, little on mortality, and nothing on the new concepts developed recently to understand the cross-currents of urbanisation and counter-urbanisation that are transforming Europe's social and geographical landscape (e.g. Champion and Hugo, 2003). For a discussion of the crucial questions of fertility trends and of family policy, the reader is referred to the expert papers by Anne Gauthier and Francesco Billari, elsewhere in this volume.

The second demographic transition

The concept of the 'Second Demographic Transition' (SDT) was undoubtedly the theory of the 1990s, and bidding fair to dominate demographic

thinking as we move into the new century, just as the 'first' demographic transition dominated that of the last. This theory that has launched a thousand research projects is described as 'the' mainstream concept among population scholars dealing with demographic change in European societies (EAPS, 2002 p. 3). Developed by Van de Kaa (1987) and Lesthaeghe (1995) around 1986, it is an ambitious model. It describes and explains the substantial and unprecedented growth of cohabitation, lone parenthood, childbearing outside marriage and low fertility observed in many countries since the 1960s, and the parallel retreat from marriage and from traditional norms of sexual restraint. All these demographic trends have been consolidated during the last two decades (see Kiernan, 2002, Heuveline et al., 2003) and, as the theory predicts, are increasing almost everywhere in the developed world, although still at different levels of prevalence from country to country (figures 1-4).

During the 1990s the concept developed actively (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2004); post-materialist demography has now evolved further into 'post-modern' demography (Van de Kaa, 2001). But in essence the theory proposes that the new freedom of sexual behaviour, the diversity of forms of sexual partnership, and the relaxation of traditional norms and constraints observed in many western societies since the 1960s, are intimately related and share common causes. They are held to be irreversible and likely to become universal in developed societies. The underlying causes are a development of the socio-economic progress in literacy and income that made possible the first demographic transition, and of which these events are a logical continuation. The new transition is made possible by parallel trends in further economic growth, intellectual emancipation through education and the concomitant ease of diffusion of ideas. Its underlying theory, derived from the work of Maslow (1954) and Inglehart (1990), posits an emancipation from traditional deferential modes of behaviour once material needs and anxieties are mostly satisfied though the achievement of prosperity and, in Europe at least, the personal security offered by the welfare states which that prosperity sustains.

FIGURE 1
Total first marriage rate, groups of European countries, 1960-2002





FIGURE 2
Total divorce rate trends, groups of European countries, 1960-2000




Source: Council of Europe (2002).

Based on this view, an educated and liberal-minded population, no longer constrained by material anxieties, is able to emancipate itself from traditional rules and strictures, unconstrained by deference to religious authority or parental sanction. More concerned with 'self-realisation' than with duty or obedience to authority, whether parental, civic or divine, individuals choose modes of life suited to their convenience. Under these circumstances, the single state, cohabitation, lone motherhood and the avoidance of parenthood are more practical and feasible and become more socially acceptable. Conduct formerly frowned upon becomes tolerated and increasingly 'normal'. The spread of these 'post-material' values in society, as measured by

questionnaire batteries, correlates with the spread of secular opinions, unconventional attitudes and tolerance of behaviour formerly regarded as deviant, immoral or criminal. These general empirical social trends have been analysed under various different ideological umbrellas, not all of them sympathetic (Murray, 1990; Fukuyama, 1999). The specific 'post-materialist' ideology underlying SDT theory has not been without its critics, some of whom find little difference between the concepts of 'materialism / post-materialism' and the conservative / liberal poles of personality, and others who find little re-test consistency or behavioural predictive value in the results (Degraaf and Evans, 1996; Marshall, 1997; Dennis and Erdos, 1992). Yet others have disputed

FIGURE 3
Per cent of persons cohabiting, selected countries, 1996




Source: Eurobarometer data from Kiernan (2002) table 5.

the complete novelty of the trends it describes, seeing more continuity with developments in the past (Cliquet, 1991).

Numerous empirical studies in western countries, however, support the theory. At national level there is indeed a syndrome of Second Demographic Transition behaviour. National populations with a high prevalence of (for example) divorce also tend to have lower levels of marriage, higher prevalence of cohabitation and of births


outside marriage, and abortion ratios, although the statistical association is not always very strong (figure 5). The prevalence or even the possibility of such behaviour is, of course, modulated by national government policies on family welfare and on legal provisions for divorce and abortion, which are far from uniform (Tomka, 2003). Most important, those individuals who score higher on ‘post-materialist’ responses are more likely to be engaged in unconventional living arrangements such as cohabitation (Lesthaeghe and Moors, 1996) and ‘do their

FIGURE 4
Births outside marriage per 1000 live births, selected countries, 1945-2001



Source: Council of Europe, National Statistical Yearbooks.

FIGURE 5
Correlation of different SDT variables



Source: Council of Europe (2002).

own thing' in many other ways. Also, the incorporation of these questions into the European Values Survey and other enquiries have shown that the prevalence of these responses increased during the 1990s in many countries, and this was in step (to put it no more strongly) with the spread of the relevant demographic behaviour. Not surprisingly, therefore, the trend towards 'post material' values and attitudes is presented by votaries of the Second Demographic Transition as an historically inevitable universal development of irresistible force. Identification of 'leader countries' which others follow has proved difficult; there does not seem to be one single trajectory. Liberating forces need not lead to convergence, unless all agree to be liberated in the same direction.


The second demographic transition and low fertility

However, although this model may be successful in accounting for differences in living arrangements and other preferences within and between European populations, it is less satisfactory when confronted with low fertility. Low fertility (meaning fertility well below replacement level) is also claimed to be part of the SDT 'syndrome'. Indeed few things could be more bound up with concepts of traditional duty, or attended with so much cost and inconvenience, as the bearing and caring for children. It would be reasonable, indeed logically necessary given the underlying theory, for populations that score highest on post-material ideational responses,


FIGURE 6

Correlation of fertility rates with divorce rates and illegitimacy ratios

Total fertility rate and total divorce rate, Western European countries, 2000



Total fertility rate and illegitimacy ratio, Western European countries, 2000




Source: Council of Europe (2002).

and which manifest strongly the other SDT attributes, to have the lowest fertility as well. That is quite strikingly not the case. Comparing national populations, the relationship between the patterns and trends of period fertility levels and other SDT behaviour are the reverse of what might have been expected (figure 6). Populations most enthusiastic for non-traditional living arrangements within the developed world (North-Western Europe and Europe's clones overseas - United States, Canada, etc.) tend to have higher fertility, where the lowest might be expected. Populations with very low fertility are typically those where traditional attitudes towards sexual relationships and living arrangements persist. Thus all the countries of Southern Europe (with the partial exception of Portugal), together with Germany, Japan and Korea have low or very low levels of divorce, cohabitation and illegitimacy while at the same time they

have the lowest fertility rates in the world (Bettio and Villa, 1996).

There are, however, other impediments to the unconditional acceptance of Second Demographic Transition theory in its complete form. The 'first' demographic transition dealt with the central demographic concerns of birth and death rates and their consequences for population size, growth and ageing. Its reverberations are still with us. Its second incarnation is an altogether lesser affair. The SDT, as argued above, does not deal with the central demographic issue of birth rates. It has nothing to say about death rates or with migration or with any large-scale demographic processes. Instead it is more concerned with micro-sociological events: sexual behaviour and living arrangements. It may also be asked to what extent a 'transition' is expected to be complete and irreversible. The first appears to be

FIGURE 7
Total first marriage rate, selected countries 1960 - 2002



Source: Council of Europe

both. However, even the 'progressive' populations most enthusiastic for the SDT remain highly heterogeneous. Only in very few countries are more than half of all births outside marriage and no population has yet abandoned marriage. In most populations, most marriages are still ended by the death of one of the partners rather than divorce. By contrast, the first demographic transition is complete: family size is tightly clustered around an average of two, 90 per cent of new babies survive to age 60, and, barring migration, the end of population growth has arrived in the developed world.

It is certainly true that SDT behaviour is generally increasing, even in those populations that have proved most resistant to change, such as in Southern Europe and Asia. But so far it remains a regionally limited phenomenon, still concentrated in its more developed form north of the Alps, although also widespread in the English-speaking world overseas. For whatever reasons, the secular trend in Second Demographic Transition behaviour was faltering, or even declining in a few populations by the end of the 1990s. The lack of increase in divorce may be simply an unsurprising consequence of the smaller and more selective part of the population that has married in recent decades. But the upward trend in total first marriage rates seen in some countries recently requires more explanation (figure 7). Little work has been done, however, on analyzing the tempo and quantum effects of marriage rates and therefore not too much should be made of this observation. Application of the Bongaarts-Feeney method (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998) to total first marriage rates (with the usual cautions) has shown that increasing delay in marriage accounts for the greater part of the apparent reduction in

propensity to marry in some populations in the mid-1990s. For example in Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, adjustment returns the TFMR from about 0.6 to about 0.8, although the final value for Bulgaria then returns to a low level (Philipov, 2003, pp. 108-109).

Those Third World populations which have reduced vital rates in a spectacular manner have so far shunned cohabitation and births outside marriage. Advocates of the SDT idea present this marked international diversity, for example in cohabitation and births outside marriage (figures 5, 6) in somewhat Hegelian fashion, as evidence of populations inexorably proceeding to a common destination, only at different speeds. They may be right, but this 'transition' may stall half-complete, much as did the earlier Reformation which made little progress south of the Alps. Some sub-populations in the western world have remained notably resistant to the SDT, particularly Asian immigrants and most of all Muslims. Arranged marriages with spouses from their countries of origin are prevalent in many of those immigrant populations. This is, in part, because even co-religionists who have been brought up in the 'enlightened' and emancipated west are not considered to be suitable marriage partners lest they have imbibed some of the questionable values under discussion here. In fact the younger generation of Muslims in Europe is showing signs of reverting to a more traditional Islam, demonstrated publicly through the wearing of headscarves and other outward signs of ethnic solidarity. That is not the way of the Second Demographic Transition.

Transitions must, presumably, be sustainable. The underlying theory of the SDT posits radical ideational

change made possible by economic progress. Are the ideational insights, once attained, irreversible irrespective of the standards of material security which made their realisation possible on a large scale? Wealth emancipates populations from anxieties about material needs and, in Europe, supports the welfare states and social housing policies on which choices of living arrangements at least partly depend. However, a variety of those welfare programmes have already been checked or reversed in many western societies, from Sweden to New Zealand. High levels of divorce and lone parenthood transfer some of the costs of the consumption of women and the production of children to the general taxpayer. They may not be affordable in the long run. In the United Kingdom for example, divorce adds about 15 per cent to the United Kingdom benefit bill. In the United Kingdom divorce creates three households for every two that existed before, and it is the quickest route out of owner-occupation into state subsidised 'social' housing (Holmans et al., 1987).

It may be asked whether modern economies can afford the long-term costs that may arise from the Second Demographic Transition as well as the unavoidable and permanent drag on economic growth presented by population ageing. Furthermore, lone parenthood tends to inflict psycho-social as well as material handicaps upon children brought up in fragmented or unconventional households, compared with those in intact families - specifically in respect to school performance, discipline and subsequent parenting (Kiernan, 1992; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001a and 2001b; Osborn, 2003). This, however, may be a special feature peculiar to the circumstances of the United Kingdom and the United States, where a higher proportion of children in non-marital households are brought up with only one parent than is the case in Europe. The age of entitlement to welfare and to rights in general may only temporarily have insulated people from the consequences of their reproductive actions and thereby only transiently permitted a wider choice of behaviour in relation to union-formation and childbearing.

The empirically observable demographic trends charted above are, of course, indisputable. It is less clear, however, that they can all be swept up as evidence for the diffusion of ideas and attitudes specified by the SDT theory. A plurality of explanations may be more suitable, depending on circumstances. For example, is the continued high level of teenage childbearing, mostly to mothers without partners, as observed since the 1970s in the United Kingdom and the United States, a component of the enlightened and self-realising behaviour envisaged by the SDT? Or is it instead, as both those government believe, a pathological manifestation, harmful to the interests of mothers and children, against which policy measures are appropriate? More generally, is the theory of ideational change sufficient for a full explanation of

the upward trends in divorce, cohabitation and the rest? Less ambitious, but more conventional economic theories based on rational choice, which are not necessarily contradictory to SDT theory, might also account for these trends. Such economic models can also account for the drawbacks of conventional marital unions and the advantages of ambiguity for women being financially independent of men through their own work when they are as well, if not better, educated (Ermisch, 1991; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000).

The second demographic transition in Central and Eastern Europe

The recent trends in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the European republics of the former Soviet Union, provide another example where a plurality of explanations may be needed to account for diverse situations. A persuasive case is made out for the diffusion of new modes of behaviour - rising cohabitation, divorce and births outside marriage - in many of these populations during the 1980s, before the collapse of communism, as part of a process of modernisation. This argument is particularly convincing in relation to the more prosperous parts of the region (Sobotka et al., 2003; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2002). However, this view may encounter more difficulties when confronted with some of the material realities of the less prosperous regions of the former Communist countries. First, in general it is difficult to see how post-materialist sensibilities, normally regarded as requiring for their nurture a secure material situation, could flourish during the serious economic downturn and heightened employment and political insecurity of the post-communist period. Furthermore, in some senses the restricted choices available in communist times went hand in hand with a high level of certainty and assurance about crucial life events - guaranteed education and employment, for example (Philipov, 2003, p. 156). Accordingly it has been suggested that communist society, with its certainties, might have been a more fruitful environment for post-materialist views than was its aftermath (Kyveldis, 2001).

Elsewhere, however, especially at a more local level, apparently 'classical' SDT behaviour (e.g. high levels of births outside marriage) might be due not to individual empowerment, but to quite different - and more socially pathological - developments, related to the prevalence of 'anomie' and trauma among the poorer elements of the population distressed and unsettled by recent changes. The highly discontinuous rapid increase of births outside marriage in Bulgaria and Romania, after over two decades of negligible change, are particularly noteworthy (figure 4). These populations were among

the poorest of the CEE countries¹ under communism, are still substantially rural and have so far failed to make successful economic or political transitions, remaining in a weak economic position (Åslund, 2001). Yet despite this unpromising theoretical environment for SDT, their proportions of births outside marriage exceed those in more prosperous, more westernised countries in Central Europe. Furthermore, demographic changes of this type are apparent even in the most geographically isolated and socially marginalised populations in those countries - Turks and gypsies (Roma) - who are perhaps the least obvious candidates for progressive ideational change.

Finally, it is necessary to account for the considerable heterogeneity of the changes in SDT-like demographic processes during the communist period. For example, in Estonia even in the 1960s, most of these innovations were becoming prominent: cohabitation ranked third in Europe; births outside marriage and early sexual experience were common in a society where female education was surpassing that of males; female work participation rates were high (in the socialist fashion) and attitudes were becoming more individualistic. Nonetheless, the fertility rate did not decline but increased almost to replacement level (Katus, 2003).

Methodological innovations in the 1990s

Analysis of this increasingly diverse behaviour and its correlates has been greatly enhanced during the 1990s by methodological innovations. The most prominent is event history analysis, a set of formal techniques for integrating information about life events, described as 'the most important new paradigm in demography' (Willekens, 1999), which has shifted attention from macro to micro analysis and from structure to process. As Willekens points out, life events such as leaving the parental home, sex, cohabitation, childbirth, employment and migration are milestones that dominate the concerns and actions of individuals. Using a statistical basis of proportional hazard techniques, event history analysis uses non-linear models to integrate and compare these events and histories, and relate them to individual circumstances. It permits more realistic analyses beyond the reach of even the most sophisticated classical macro-approaches using multi-state life tables (Courgeau, 2002). As noted below, however, such concentration on individual-level processes risks losing sight of the traditional large-scale concerns of demography which are just as important as ever. However, multi-state modelling (Goldstein, 1995), scarcely known in the 1980s, but which has become much more widely used in demography in the 1990s, has enabled individual level data and aggregate 'ecological' variables (which may have no equivalent at the individual level) to be

incorporated into the same statistical analyses (see, for example, Lievens, 1998). These techniques have enabled the true pattern of demographic events to be determined, independently of other influences, sometimes revealing that the true picture is quite the reverse of that which might be supposed by inferring individual results from aggregated data.

At the end of the day, event history analysis cannot of itself be the final demographic paradigm. Its function is to clarify sequences and relationships between life events. It only provides a means for analysing their causes in terms of sequences of events; it provides no mechanism for the analysis of ultimate causes or consequences of the events in terms of independent variables. That must surely be regarded as the higher aim of demography. In short, in the broad sense it is not a demographic theory, only a tool. The marked enthusiasm for event history analysis in some circles seems to have been at the expense of analysis of larger-scale analysis of, for example, the effects of population change on the environment or on individual behaviour. That risks confirming the accusations that demography, as an 'object science' (Dykstra and Van Wissen, 1999), is a theory-free subject, being more concerned with description and technical analysis rather than with explanation. Event history analysis refines the raw material for theory to work on; it provides no explanations of its own.

Brief mention should be made of some valuable new sources of data intended to analyse demographic developments in the light of Second Demographic Transition ideas, by providing retrospective life-histories suitable for event history techniques. These are the set of standardised international enquiries into partnership and reproductive behaviour promoted by the Family and Fertility Surveys of the UNECE mounted in 24 countries during the 1990s (Cliquet, 2002), and now to be followed by a new round of Generations and Gender surveys which have been designed around a developed theoretical perspective.

Population ageing and population decline

Persistent low fertility, together with increases in survival, lead naturally to older population structures. Sooner or later it will go hand in hand with population decline. Natural decrease has already arrived in some western countries; in Germany, Italy and Greece only net immigration prevents actual population decline. Within the next thirty years all European countries are expected to follow Italy into 'natural decline', where deaths exceed births - some very gradually, others more rapidly, depending primarily on past and future levels of fertility (Lutz et al., 2003). That will go hand in hand with a more aged population. Population decline, as opposed to natural decrease, will be deferred until later, because net immigration is expected to continue. Alone in the

¹ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Russian Federation, Ukraine.

UNECE area, the population of the United States is not expected to decline at all in the long run but to continue to increase, indeed at an impressive rate. The populations of Europe as a whole as compared to the United States, are thus on divergent paths. This disparity in growth between the United States and Europe has excited financial journalists who see much economic and geopolitical significance in the future demographic disparities between even an expanded EU, and a United States continuing to grow to 500 million and beyond. Both, however, face similar pressures from their neighbours.

Demographic pressures from neighbours

The populations of Europe's Muslim neighbours in North Africa and Turkey, minor players economically and demographically in the early 20th century, have now accelerated past the European total population. The Mediterranean is now the greatest demographic, economic and cultural gulf in the world (Chesnais, 1995). The countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean continue to send large numbers of their citizens to Europe. Behind them the vast demographic potential of sub-Saharan Africa, its growth only moderately checked by AIDS, continues its population increase, propelled by huge demographic inertia and very late transition. Of the 14 countries which have not yet even started the demographic transition, 12 are in Africa and one (Yemen) in the Middle East. Their potential is impressive: the population of Yemen is projected to exceed that of the Russian Federation shortly after 2050 (Demeny, 2003).

At the other end of the UNECE area, the United States looks across a parallel if less striking demographic and economic gulf towards Mexico and Latin America. There the disparity is less marked: Latin America has made more economic progress and fertility is falling faster. Furthermore, the United States population is growing much faster than that of Europe, through its more youthful age structure, its higher fertility and its high levels of immigration. Its projected future growth is due substantially to the immigration of large numbers of the Latin American population, together with their higher birth rates, into the United States.

Finally, in the Far East of the region, an old demographic gulf, which was much discussed in the Cold War period, continues unnoticed. Russia's Muslim Asiatic hinterland, separated not by river or sea but by steppe, was a nagging security problem even in Soviet times; it now continues to gain ground demographically, despite chaos and civil war, while the Russian population falls. Projections to 2050, however, do not suggest that these republics² will approach the Russian total by then. While the legacy of communism has obviously radically

changed many things (such as the status of revived religion), Russian hegemony continues, and despite much return migration, a substantial number of Russian nationals remain in Central Asia (figure 8).

Population ageing

The population of the UNECE, like that of the whole world, is getting older and all its countries, sooner or later, will have to face and manage the consequences. That is an inevitable consequence of low vital rates. In the last century, fertility decline was the main engine behind population ageing. Fertility, now constant or even rising, will eventually make no further contribution to population ageing. Instead, continued mortality improvements will be the dominant or only factor behind population ageing and has already become so in some western countries (Calot and Sardon, 1999). Given an average family size of 1.8, which is about the level of the higher fertility European countries such as France and Norway, the percentage aged 65 and over would stabilise at about 23 per cent at current mortality rates. At 1.6, about the European average, that percentage would rise to about 28 per cent. With persistent really low fertility, like that seen in the Southern and Eastern European countries, the percentage would rise to well over 30 per cent. In the absence of net immigration, stable populations with these rates would experience population decline varying from 0.25 per cent per year to 0.75 per cent per year and have potential support ratios between 2.0 and 1.1 (table 1). Differences in fertility that may appear small will generate, over decades, highly divergent age structures. Of course we are not dealing, yet, with stable populations, which will take some decades to emerge. For the time being, the age structure in many western populations is still favourable for positive natural increase, if only marginally, thanks to the inheritance from the 20th century of large age groups of reproductive age, particularly from the baby boom period. But that demographic bonus is fast running out. Most western countries are on the cusp of population ageing and sooner or later will acquire a negative momentum generating natural decline (Lutz et al., 2003).


If fertility remains stable or increases, then mortality decline, if it lasts, will eventually become the only ongoing agent of population ageing in the future. The reverse is true in Eastern Europe. There, in the absence of a 1960s baby boom, momentum from the age structure is in any case more modest. In many countries of the region very low birth rates combined with persistently high death rates have conspired together to push most populations into natural decline already.

The current outlook seems particularly unfavourable, because we are coming to the end of a short and transient period of unusually benign age structure. During the latter half of the 20th century, the more developed countries could enjoy the benefits of low dependency from fewer children together with a

² Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

FIGURE 8

Major UNECE regions and their neighbours - demographic contrasts across the Mediterranean, the steppes of Central Asia and the Rio Grande
(millions)



Source: UN World Population Prospects - the 2002 revision

relatively low proportion of pensioners inherited from earlier times. That demographic bonus is now disappearing and will not return; it is now being enjoyed - for a while - by some Third World countries. The

increasing numbers of older people can be projected with reasonable confidence; they have already been born. The standard picture of projected population ageing is very well known and needs little elaboration here. Thanks to

TABLE 1
Stable populations with given levels of period fertility

	TFR 1.55	TFR 1.78	TFR 2.07
Rate of population change (per 1 000) ...	-10.0	-5.0	-
Mean age	46.8	43.9	40.9
Per cent population under 15 years	13.0	15.7	18.7
Per cent population aged 15-64	59.4	60.7	61.3
Per cent population aged 65 and over	27.6	23.7	20.1
Overall dependency ratio	68.3	64.9	63.2
Aged dependency ratio	46.5	39.0	32.7
Potential support ratio	2.2	2.6	3.1

Source: Calculated from Coale and Demeny, 1982, pp. 79, 129.

Note: Expectation of life at birth in all cases 80.0 years for females, 76.0 for males.

persistent low fertility over many years, contrasting levels and paces of ageing, and their international rank order, different countries will develop a distinct pattern in the years to come (table 2).

Southern European countries now have the most rapidly ageing populations, having overtaken countries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden in the 1990s. The CEE countries are only kept temporarily out of the same league because their fertility decline is more recent and because their death rates, in many cases, remain high.

Today the potential support ratio (PSR=the number of people of potential working age for every person of retired dependent age) stands at about four in most European countries and over five in the Russian Federation and the United States (if calculated on the conventional age limits of 15-64 and 65 and over). If calculated using the more realistic age limits of 20-59 and 60 and over, the figure is closer to 3 (3.1 in the EU 15 in 2001). That is not the real ratio of actual workers or taxpayers to retired dependents, which is much less (about 2.5 to 1). Only about 64 per cent of Europeans aged 15-64 are actually at work, the balance being unemployed, occupied in family work, studying, etc. All western countries are beginning with a PSR of around about four calculated on the conventional basis but this will decline by 2050 to rather different levels: over two in the case of France and the United Kingdom, well under two in the case of Germany, and in the case of Italy and Spain, down to less than one and a half (table 2). These results imply quite big differences in future problems for the economy, productivity, dependency and other indicators.

This future diversity means that it makes little sense to propose common 'European' solutions. Despite the claims of the European Commission (2001), there is no common 'European' problem, rather a wide variety of

TABLE 2
Evolution of the age structure 2000-2050, selected countries

	France		Germany		Italy		Netherlands		Spain	
	65+ per cent	PSR	65+ per cent	PSR	65+ per cent	PSR	65+ per cent	PSR	65+ per cent	PSR
2000	16.0	4.08	16.4	4.15	18.1	3.73	13.6	5.01	17.0	4.01
2010	16.6	3.95	20.2	3.31	20.6	3.22	15.3	4.49	18.5	3.69
2020	20.5	3.05	22.5	2.91	23.9	2.71	19.8	3.33	21.3	3.14
2030	23.8	2.52	27.7	2.16	28.6	2.11	24.2	2.52	26.5	2.37
2040	26.2	2.21	30.9	1.84	34.5	1.57	27.1	2.14	33.3	1.68
2050	26.7	2.15	31.0	1.83	35.9	1.47	26.5	2.22	37.6	1.36
Indicator values in 2050										
TFR		1.9		1.61		1.61		1.81		1.64
Life expectancy at birth, male		80.6		80.7		79.5		79.6		78.4
Life expectancy at birth, female		87.3		86.2		85.6		84.9		85.9
Net migration		40		180		60		30		30
	United Kingdom		Norway		Hungary		Russia		United States	
	65+ per cent	PSR	65+ per cent	PSR	65+ per cent	PSR	65+ per cent	PSR	65+ per cent	PSR
2000	15.8	4.13	15.4	4.21	14.6	4.69	12.5	5.56	12.3	5.35
2010	17.0	3.94	16.0	4.18	16.0	4.38	13.3	5.50	12.8	5.21
2020	20.2	3.21	20.0	3.23	19.7	3.41	16.7	4.17	15.9	4.03
2030	24.3	2.48	23.5	2.56	21.5	3.02	21.8	3.00	19.2	3.20
2040	27.2	2.13	26.5	2.16	24.8	2.47	23.5	2.69	19.8	3.12
2050	27.3	2.12	26.2	2.21	28.8	1.99	27.0	2.17	20.0	3.11
Indicator values in 2050										
TFR		1.91		2.07		1.85		1.85		1.85
Life expectancy at birth, male		80.6		80.8		76.0		70.9		79.2
Life expectancy at birth, female		85.6		86.7		82.4		77.4		84.1
Net migration		95		10		1		50		1 100

Source: United Nations World Population Prospects 2000, 2002 Medium Variant

national ones that require their own individual policy responses. The countries of Southern Europe, with their low fertility, 'familist' traditions, rejection of Second Demographic Transition behaviour, low female workforce participation rates, high unemployment and rigid labour regulations, resemble somewhat the low-fertility developed societies of Asia (for example Japan, South Korea and Singapore). In demographic terms, the countries of North-Western Europe, with their higher birth rates, high levels of cohabitation and births outside marriage, weak kinship structures and high female workforce participation resemble more the populations of the English-speaking world overseas, although they differ radically from the United States (less from Canada) in terms of welfare provision and taxation. These contrasts are well illustrated by projections of the future populations of potential workforce entry age (20-24). In North-Western Europe the expectation is of relative constancy (including an element of migration, of course), while in other European areas a steep decline is expected, despite considerable immigration (figure 9).

Population age structure is not the only factor that determines the impact of population ageing on society and the economy. Those effects are modulated by levels of workforce participation, by labour productivity, by the structure of pension systems and their sustainability or cumulated indebtedness. These differ considerably between countries and differences are likely to persist into the future. Impact of demographic and non-demographic factors has been brought together in an index of the impact of ageing which considerably alters our picture of the most vulnerable populations in the

future (figure 10). Many of the assumptions about the future values of relevant variables may be questioned, and the UN projections used are not ideal. Nonetheless such exercises may put the spotlight more accurately on the danger areas.

What can we do about it?

There is no 'solution' to population ageing short of a return to much higher rates of population growth or mass age-specific euthanasia. Today's age structure is non-sustainable. Immigration cannot solve problems of population ageing except at rates of immigration so high that they would generate economically and environmentally unsustainable population growth rates and permanently and radically change the cultural and ethnic composition of the host population (Coleman, 2000). Figure 11 shows the population size consequent on the migration needed to preserve the current potential support ratio in the United Kingdom up to 2100. Today's population of 60 million would have doubled to 120 million by 2050 because the United Kingdom would be importing on average 1.2 million persons per year. By 2100, up to five million new immigrants would be needed every year, and the population would have risen to 312 million, not much less than the present population of the whole EU.

The *reductio ad absurdum* of all this is what one might call the 'Korea syndrome': the level of immigration required in order to preserve the current potential support ratio in the Republic of Korea and its consequences for population growth. In order to preserve their present potential support ratio of 10:1 through

FIGURE 9
Population aged 20-24, selected European countries, 2000-2050 (2000 = 100)




FIGURE 10
Ageing vulnerability index, 2003

	Overall index		Public burden	Fiscal room	Benefit dependence	Elder affluence
	Rank	Score	Rank	Rank	Rank	Rank
Australia	1	-1	2	2	4	6
United Kingdom	2	7	1	1	6	11
United States	3	18	3	4	3	1
Canada	4	42	6	6	5	2
Sweden	5	48	4	3	8	10
Japan	6	50	9	9	1	3
Germany	7	52	7	5	11	5
Netherlands	8	62	8	7	9	4
Belgium	9	63	5	8	10	9
France	10	81	10	10	12	8
Italy	11	84	11	11	2	12
Spain	12	93	12	12	7	7
	<i>weight</i>		<i>1/3</i>	<i>1/3</i>	<i>1/6</i>	<i>1/6</i>

Source: Jackson and Howe 2003, figure 18.


immigration, the population of Korea would need to increase to 6.2 billion people by the year 2050. Just by coincidence, this happens to be the entire population of the planet at the present time, so we would all have to go there (Coleman, 2002b).

Of course immigration does have a favourable impact upon the age structure and can, in theory, maintain population size or workforce size, although to keep those constant would require an implausibly precise level of management: immigration has always been easier to start than to stop. The problem is that the effect is not very great and immigration is an inefficient way of achieving this end. Immigrants themselves age and then

require more immigrants, as it were, to replace their number. Also, there is a tendency for immigrant birth rates to converge to those of the host population, although this is by no means a certainty.

Population ageing is not a consequence of a failure of migration: birth rates are a more effective way of changing age structure, without population growth. But population ageing cannot be ‘solved’ by fertility either, although it is easier to moderate it by that route. Even if the birth rate rose up to replacement level, the potential support ratio would only increase to about 3. That would imply no further population growth and eventually an end to further population ageing given constant mortality. To

FIGURE 11
Net annual immigration required to maintain UK potential support ratio, 2000-2100



Source: United Kingdom Government Actuary's Department.

keep the PSR at the current level of four, an average family size of about three and a half would be required, implying population growth of about 1.8 per cent per year.

Managing population ageing

What matters, however, is not so much demographic abstractions such as the potential support ratio but rather whether the future costs of dependency are sustainable in the economic and social environment of the future. Workforce, retirement and pension reforms within the demographic system offer many flexible and promising ways of adapting to population ageing and preserving the viability of economic systems, some of the measures in any case being desirable in their own right. Together with improvements in productivity, such measures offer the prospect of a reasonably effective and affordable management of this burden as long as birth rates are not too low, even though they definitely cannot offer a 'solution' (Daykin and Lewis, 1999).

First we need to consider first the 'real' support ratios, that is the actual number of taxpayers in relation to aged dependant people. In making such calculations we need to take into account the future reduction of dependency arising from the decline of the youthful dependant population. Average actual retirement age today is already substantially below the 'official' retirement age, being about 58. Early retirement, late entry into the workforce and modest workforce participation rates already give actual support ratios of about 2.5 taxpayers per pensioner in the United Kingdom, and even fewer elsewhere, not the nominal 4.1 of the potential support ratio (Government Actuary, 1999). This lower ratio is being managed today without notable problems.

No one management factor can ameliorate the situation all by itself except with considerable discomfort. We therefore need to address simultaneously as many of these contributing factors as possible.

There is considerable scope for increasing the actual workforce within the existing boundaries of working age. European countries have very high levels of demographic reserves. In the EU, only 64 per cent of the nominal 'working' population aged 15-64 is economically active. This is the lowest of any major industrial area in the world. In Spain and Italy, only just over half the population aged 15-64 actually has a job (table 3). Mobilising this spare capacity, in which existing foreign populations are disproportionately over-represented already, would address many social problems as well as helping to meet workforce needs (see Punch and Pearce, 2000). Because of low current employment rates, the potential workforce in Germany would be sufficient to meet its likely needs until 2020, if fully utilised (Fuchs, 1995). An increase of participation rates to the levels already achieved in Denmark, for example, would add 32

TABLE 3

Employment and unemployment, selected countries 2001, ages 15-64

	Employment rate			Unemployment rate
	Both sexes	Males	Females	Both sexes
Denmark	75.9	80.2	71.4	4.2
France	62.7	76.0	55.7	8.6
Germany	65.7	72.6	58.7	7.8
Netherlands	74.1	82.7	65.3	2.1
Spain	57.5	70.9	42.7	10.4
Switzerland	79.1	87.6	70.6	2.5
United Kingdom	71.6	78.2	64.9	4.7


Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2001, table 13, table 53.

million people to the EU workforce (figure 12). Similarly, a return to the levels actually achieved among men in the 1960s, would go a long way to meet adverse future ageing changes.

Combining Eurostat projections of populations and assuming modest increases in workforce participation, it can be shown that the actual workforce in all EU countries will continue to increase for the time being, and in all cases (except that of Italy) will not decline below current levels before 2020 (Feld, 2000). However, improvements in workforce participation rates cannot have further enhancing effects once they have reached their maximum level, beyond say 2020. Labour market reform is also needed to support older workers, for instance with the following measures: permitting a gradual rather than an abrupt transition from work to retirement; the moderation of the tax penalties for working after pensionable age; and less pressure at work for older workers.

The most potentially effective measures relate to later retirement age, which improves both sides of the dependency equation. While formal retirement age is 65 in many EU states, actual retirement age is commonly about 58 or 59. Preservation of today's actual support ratio would require actual retirement age to rise by between five and six years, to 66. On that basis, managing the additional costs of elderly dependency simply requires people to stop work when they are 'expected' to. If 65 really was the actual current retirement age, then the current support ratio would be fully preserved with an increase of retirement age to between 72 and 76, depending on the population. Full preservation of the support ratio is, however, neither necessary nor, probably, possible. Neither should we minimize the difficulties of substantial increases in average retirement age, especially for manual workers, when there is popular pressure to reduce it or to take early retirement. But as expectation of life after 65 continues to increase, then an extension of working life must keep pace with it. Fortunately, recent findings suggest that

FIGURE 12
 Potential increase in EU 15 workforce, 1999, given Danish participation rates
 (Millions)



Source: Calculations based on Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2002).

most additional years of life are active years. In the longer run, it will not be possible for populations to live longer without working longer.

Improvements in productivity, highly desirable in their own right, would rectify much of the threatened economic shortfall and would compensate for the relative shortage of workers. The European Commission's 'Annual Review of the Demographic Situation in Europe' in 1995 (European Commission, 1996) noted that additional productivity growth required to meet the additional demands on the economy created from pensions would be between 0.1 per cent and 0.3 per cent annually up to 2005, increasing to 0.5 per cent per year by 2025. That apparently small increase is, in terms of productivity growth, substantial, and not easy to achieve. Economic diversion on this scale to pay for pensions would, for example, reduce a real annual GDP growth rate from (say) 3 per cent to 2.5 per cent. Similar conclusions have been reached by other economists in the United States (Lee et al., 1988; Lee, 2000; UNECE, 1999).

However it would not do to minimise the political problems obstructing necessary reforms. In many European countries, workforce participation is constrained by poor support for (would-be) working women with families, by interminable degree courses (favoured in the 1980s to disguise youth unemployment), and by pressures to keep and even expand early retirement. As most of the population has a vested interest in them, there is great reluctance to accept a revision of unsustainably generous pay-as-you-go underfunded pension schemes, which pay up to 80 per cent of wages over a long retirement, and which are commonplace in Europe. In the last two or three years,


modest proposed reforms have provoked, for example, general strikes in Italy, transport disruption in France and political turmoil in Germany, which all goes to show how difficult it is going to be to wean Europe's workers off the state they have enjoyed during the fat years of the late 20th century.

Immigration and its discontents

Migration - the new engine of demographic and social change

As already cited as a response to the ageing population and dwindling labour markets, migration has now moved to the front line of demographic analysis. In the early 1980s net migration flows into Europe were ebbing. All that has changed. In 1992 international migration to Europe reached an all-time peak, estimated at a gross inflow of 2.7 million from all sources (Widgren, 1994), a precarious estimate including illegal immigration, an estimate which has not yet, however, been dethroned. Net annual inflow to the European Union, as estimated by Eurostat, only briefly fell below 0.5 million in the mid-1990s and since then has risen to nearer one million. This net figure is similar to the gross inflows to the United States, although into a larger population. However, migration can go down as well as up (figure 13) and some national trends underline this: for example, in 1997 and 1998 net foreign migration to Germany became negative, as Polish worker recruitment fell and many Yugoslavs granted temporary protection in 1992 returned home. The flows that make up this total, in and out, are in some cases quite separate and independent although most have tended to rise. Some

FIGURE 13
EU 15 net foreign immigration 1960-2001



flows have been inherited from the past; others are quite new.

The flows are too complex to describe in detail here. Excellent overviews are available in respect of the Council of Europe countries (Salt, 2003) and for OECD member states (OECD, 2003), together with two new global compendia: from the United Nations Population Division (2003) and from the International Organization for Migration (2003). Comprehension of migration processes is muddled by the poor and incompatible statistics available (Salt et al., 1993; Poulain, 1996), by the uncertainties of migration theory and by the great difficulty of making projections on any rational basis (see Hilderink et al., 2001). Migration is powerfully affected by the economic and demographic situation in the sending countries, by labour demand in the host countries, by the political situation in each and the historical connections between them. The size of immigrant groups already in the host country and their propensity to perpetuate chain migration by arranged marriage and attracting and absorbing illegal or irregular immigrants is becoming more salient. Political effects on migration flows have tended to be ignored by economists preoccupied with their models (Hollifield, 2000).


Labour migration

Labour migration is the focus of debate by economists and the media. Most immigrants to Europe and the United States are not, in fact, workers, but nonetheless labour flows promote and perpetuate subsequent flows of dependents and spouses. Since the latter 1990s gross labour migration inflow to Europe,

long-term and temporary, has increased despite the economic slowdown in the Euro zone (Salt and Clarke, 2003). Totals of work-permit immigration from those countries which provide data rose from about 200,000 in 1989 to a peak of 650,000 in 1992 following German reunification. Then the inflow fell to 400,000 in 1995, rising again to over 500,000 by the end of the decade (figure 14). These are all gross inflows; few data on net flows of labour are available. This is all movement from outside the EU; movement between EU countries does not require a permit. The reasons for the growth of labour migration are mixed. The information technology sector needs labour because its rapid growth has outstripped the ability of domestic resources to train suitable personnel. On the other hand, the recruitment of skilled medical workers, especially nurses, from overseas is more a reflection of poor working conditions arising from under-funding over many years, which has created a dependency on foreign workers (notably in the United Kingdom). There the problem is not so much an absolute shortage - as many trained nurses no longer work in the profession - but "a shortage of nurses willing to work under the conditions being offered them" (OECD, 2003, p. 23).

Believing that it might improve their competitive position, many European countries changed their migration laws in the 1990s to favour the recruitment of skilled professionals from overseas (OECD, 2001). However the interest may be transient and the results disappointing: as an example, IT jobs were withdrawn from the official United Kingdom list of shortage occupations within 18 months despite official claims that 200,000 more workers were needed. The German 'green

FIGURE 14
Gross labour inflows, selected Western European countries, 1989-2000



Source: OECD (2003) table A.2.1.

card' for overseas IT specialists has remained under-subscribed. The number of foreign nurses in the British National Health Service remained constant up to 2000, despite substantially increased recruitment. At the other end of the scale, recruitment of unskilled workers, often on a temporary basis, is expanding to include work in agriculture, building and domestic services, despite persistently high unemployment in Europe - particularly among foreigners themselves. Unregulated, casual trades also attract many illegal immigrants; they are also prominent in prostitution and the drugs trade.

Some European governments, notably that of the United Kingdom, have been persuaded that a greater inflow of potential workers benefits the economy, even if they are not recruited to specific jobs. Accordingly all kinds of conditions for immigration have been relaxed stimulating a substantial increase of inflows to the United Kingdom. Others have maintained a more selective approach and have not opened their doors to the new EU accession countries. The economic evidence on which this is based seems rather tenuous and some of it is negative. For example, immigration can be shown to increase both local unemployment (Dustmann et al., 2003) and remote unemployment (Hatton and Tani, 2003). Immigrants naturally increase overall GDP insofar as they increase population but they may not increase GDP per head, which is what matters from the viewpoint of individual welfare. Much depends on the composition of the migrant flows. Some studies, e.g. in Sweden, show that all immigration taken together imposes a net economic cost on the country; other studies, e.g. in Denmark and the United States, show benefits to the middle class but a reduction of income


among the less well paid (Storesletten, 2003; Wadensjö, 1999). In general, immigrants from poor countries tend to impose a net cost on their host societies while immigrants from developed countries tend to bring net benefits. Furthermore workers leave as well as enter. The net effect of migration on the labour force is generally unknown; many countries lack emigration data. But in the United Kingdom, which does collect departure data on a sample basis, outflow can be substantial. During the 1990s, almost as many persons left the United Kingdom as entered it for purposes of work, and the net inflow of labour migration to the United Kingdom was only 10,000 in 2000 and 36,000 in 2001 (when 90,000 United Kingdom workers departed). One wonders why.

Family migration

Chains of migration pulled in by existing immigrant communities (OECD, 1978), often founded initially by workers, have given a momentum to flows which then owe little to economic considerations. Since the 1970s most legal migration into Europe and North America - up to 80 per cent - has been not of persons arriving ostensibly to work, but of dependants, relatives, spouses and new marriage partners, as well as persons arriving independently as students and more recently as asylum claimants, many of whom contrive to stay one way or another. The magnitude - and the variety - of this pattern is seen in figure 15. For example, in France in the early 1990s, over 80 per cent of migration from North Africa was classified as family reasons or humanitarian, and into Austria it was about 90 per cent (Biffl, 2002). Even in North America, where the economic effects of migration are most loudly praised, the priority given to 'Family

FIGURE 15

Proportion of immigrants entering selected countries categorised as workers, family reunification and refugees



Source: Source: OECD (2003) chart 1.2, reproduced by permission. For notes see original.


Preference visas' ensures that H-1B labour visas still accounted for only 20 per cent of legal entries (in the United States 163,000 H-1B visas were actually issued in 2001, out of a quota of 195,000, and in 2003 the H-1B quota was reduced to 65,000). In Canada a similar priority for families reduced the economic migrants to a variable and residual category within the quota until recently.

In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the growth of immigrant minority societies in Europe, through ongoing immigration and strong natural increase, has created powerful poles of attraction for further migration through marriage and other processes of chain migration. Minority populations from North Africa, the Middle East and Asia - Muslims and Hindus - tend to prefer arranged marriages with persons of the same religion, race, nationality, caste and in the case of (e.g.) Pakistani Muslims, close relatives such as first cousins or nieces. Among many groups, life in the west has not weakened these preferences. Immigrants may cling to traditional ways even more tightly than those who remain

in the country of origin. Some, notably Muslims, reject or distrust western secularism and prefer to import brides of guaranteed provenance and purity, free of liberal and disturbing western ideas and attitudes, who have had no opportunities to compromise family honour. Such migration also increases the size, and the local power, of immigrant populations. This process is notable among Turks although less among Moroccans in Belgium (Surkyn, 1998), similarly among Turks but less among Algerians in France (Tribalat, 1995), and among South Asians in Britain (Coleman, 1995). In the Netherlands, marriage migration is now the most important route of entry (except asylum) for Turks and Moroccans (figure 16).

This represents a failure of integration and its practice erodes it further. Chain migration slows down assimilation to modern demographic norms and integration, while high levels of in-marriage are associated with other indicators of enclosure and lack of integration (Lesthaeghe et al., 1998). The intensity of marriage migration also responds to the desire, among

FIGURE 16
Spouse migration by sex and New Commonwealth origin, UK 1973-2001



Source: Data from Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics.

large numbers of people in the Third World, to emigrate to the west. There is widespread advertising for this purpose in the press and various rackets in the host countries. The rise of new spouse migration has created a powerful and accelerating dynamic of migration to Europe. In the late 1980s and 1990s this eclipsed the migration of established spouses in immigration streams to Europe, for example in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, especially after the abolition of the 'primary purpose rule' of checks intended to prevent the abuse of family migration. Nowhere have the expectations of integration been more frustrated.

Asylum and illegal migration


The creation of asylum laws fifty years ago to clear up post-war chaos and distress has turned out to be a very open-ended commitment. The discovery of these laws by potential migrants from poor and troubled countries of the world has opened the way to a cumulative total of over 6.6 million asylum claims made in Europe since 1980 (because of duplicate claims, the number of individuals will actually be smaller). That total is about the same as the cumulated number of labour migrants since 1980. Although most claims are rejected, it is believed that most claimants nonetheless manage to remain in Europe. This parallel migration stream has greatly augmented flows into Europe and diversified the foreign-origin populations in all European countries (figure 17). Patterns and problems of asylum have been

treated in depth by Penninx for this meeting and need no repetition here (see also UNHCR, 2004).

The most salient conflict for Europe, in former Yugoslavia, paradoxically produced few actual asylum claims at the time, although many since. The usual asylum screening was clearly inappropriate and would have been overwhelmed. Most of the 2 million or so given shelter were given 'temporary protection'; many have indeed returned to their former country, if not their former homes. While claims from particular countries ebb and flow in response to political situations, once started from a poor country to a rich country they persist, and new flows constantly arise. Yugoslavia apart, it has not been easy to make a clear connection between the intensity of political unrest in the world and changes in overall asylum claims.

Europe is in a state of confusion over asylum. No political system wants claimants; they are seldom welcome in large numbers by the mass of the electorate. But moral principles of governments, their adhesion to international agreements and pressure group agitation all override popular opinion. In persistently affirming their commitment to asylum, governments send a welcoming message to the world which in practice they then do their best to frustrate through visa systems, action against traffickers and continual attempts to simplify, and usually make stricter, the asylum system. Yet in the 1990s no European country has seriously considered the question of radical reform of the asylum principle. Asylum has

FIGURE 17
 Migration trends to Western European countries, 1980-2002
 (Thousands)



become a process of mass population movement, as never intended, as well as a means of protection.

Asylum claiming is closely connected with illegal entry and over-staying; many claimants enter illegally and then make a claim at a later date when apprehended. Those apart, a variety of unauthorised means of entry (IGC, 1995; Widgren, 1994; Salt, 2000) contribute to a total of between 350,000 and 500,000 illegal entrants to Western Europe each year, with an illegally resident population of perhaps 3 million. Rather more secure estimates for the United States put the annual inflow at about 350,000 and the stock at 5 million. Repeated amnesties secure the position of earlier illegal immigrant cohorts and do nothing to reduce further inflows (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2003).

Changes in attitudes and policy, and their effectiveness

Policy is more important in determining migration patterns than any other component of demographic change, and no phenomenon related to demographic change has had more impact on politics. But the political pressures are contradictory, and policy may change radically following elections which remove one government and replace it with another. Conflicting beliefs confuse the picture. Popular opinion in general opposes mass migration, especially from outside Europe, but political elites take a more permissive view. Immigrant and race relations pressure groups can exert more power than these diffuse concerns and can focus it effectively on ministers. Hence liberal democracies do

not find it easy to control immigration (Freeman, 1994). As noted above, some governments consider large-scale migration to be economically beneficial, or even essential for the labour market or for demographic stability. The United Kingdom government has even adopted American rhetoric in praise of the cultural diversity which mass migration brings with it. It is often claimed that immigration is in any case impossible to stop or reverse. A conviction of impotence is thus allied with economic self-interest in the new idea of 'managed' migration (Council of Europe, 2000; IOM, 2003).

These sentiments seldom take into account the social and ethnic transformation of urban areas in Europe, not those where elites live on the whole, which disquiets popular opinion. It is customary to dismiss such concerns as 'racism' and 'xenophobia'. In the last few years, however, electorates have made their views felt by supporting right-wing or far right-wing parties, shocking the political establishment in Northern Italy, in Austria, in the French Presidential election and in the Dutch general election of 2002. They nearly overturned the German government in 2003 and stalled its new, more open migration law; in Denmark they returned a centre-right government with a restrictive immigration agenda and in Switzerland they disturbed the consensus politics. Even where the right-wing parties have failed or later fallen apart, much of the drift of their policy has been absorbed by mainline parties. Even in the United Kingdom, a government still devoted to talking up and stoking up legal migration, has adopted asylum legislation (the fourth since 1993) of a severity which might not have

been contemplated by its Conservative, more right-wing, predecessor.

The growth of all forms of migration, new and growing migration pressures from abroad, the changing political situation at home and abroad, and the ascendancy of the EU over national interests since 1998, have provoked a series of new laws. Some are designed to regulate and restrict immigration, especially asylum, although others are more permissive. Former communist countries have had to start from scratch, as have former emigration countries. For example the new and generous Irish legislation of 1996, formalising entitlement to asylum for the first time, has put the Irish Republic on the asylum map to such an extent that it now has one of the highest inflows per head of population in Europe, giving Irish society a wholly new multiracial element. The United Kingdom government's incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into English law has further strengthened the hand of judges against ministerial attempts to stem asylum flows, assisted by numerous pressure groups funded by government and public lotteries.

Finally, migration has gained further prominence in political debate through a *volte-face* in attitudes to it by many of Europe's governments and media. As European population growth has started to run out of steam and population ageing has risen up the political agenda, opinions have become more convoluted. Originally seen as 'unwanted foreigners', immigrants are now regarded by some as our demographic salvation: necessary to supply a missing workforce, providing care for the growing army of elderly and in general saving European populations from the trouble of reproducing themselves.

Unique events – war and state collapse

The biggest migration surprises were provoked by the unique political crises in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, in the Soviet Union in 1991 and in Yugoslavia in 1992. One of the surprises was that the expected mass migration of newly liberated Eastern European and former Soviet citizens did not materialise. Migration rates have certainly increased, however, for example through short-term work schemes from Poland to Germany, increased work permit migration, students and illegal immigrants everywhere, including the most surprising places (e.g. the numerous Russian prostitutes in Istanbul; IOM, 1995). Over the decade, CEE and former Soviet Union populations in Western Europe, formerly sparse, have increased substantially, although they still only comprise 0.1 per cent to 5 per cent of total population (net of naturalisation) (table 4). The higher percentages in Germany in table 4 arise from guest-worker populations of long standing from former Yugoslavia. The United States and Canada have also gained new CEE and former Soviet populations, including most of the emigrants from Armenia and Georgia.

Ethnic migration

Perhaps surprisingly, for some time ethnic migration continued to dominate migration in and out of the Eastern part of the area following the opening of frontiers and the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Some of these flows were continuations of flows fitfully established during the Cold War: *aussiedler* to Germany, Jews (especially from Russia) to Israel and America. New ethnic flows, previously prevented by the Iron Curtain, also arose, for example of gypsies and others claiming asylum in Germany. The negotiated return of 30,000 of them to Romania proved to be an expensive business. A new CEE gypsy presence is seen throughout European cities. The large gypsy minority is one of the few components of CEE population with vigorous rates of natural increase and with many reasons for wanting to migrate.

A real surprise was the rise of Russia, for a while around 1994, to become Europe's biggest immigrant destination. The end of the Soviet Union left 24 million people of Russian 'nationality' somewhat isolated in newly independent post-Soviet republics, the natives of which were by no means all favourably disposed towards their old masters. Return migration to Russia, perhaps a third of it forced, topped a million a year, though that has now fallen. This flow moderates Russian population loss, partly compensating for the $\frac{3}{4}$ million annual deficit of births over deaths.

The effect on the sending areas too should not be forgotten. During the 1990s, ancient Jewish communities were rapidly being eliminated by emigration. The German-origin settlements in *Mittleuropa* and further East, which dated from the 18th century, are coming to an end, with results by no means uniformly happy. The population of Armenia has declined by a third.

If the old diversity of the CEE is being lost, it was more than compensated in the 1990s by the arrival of entirely new populations. These are still small in number, officially between 0.1 and 2 per cent of total population, although the official figures are likely to be substantial under-estimates (table 4). More open borders to the west, and the dissolution of previously formidable border security, have attracted considerable migration flows, creating completely new Asian and African populations in Eastern Europe. Initially, most were seeking easier entry to the more attractive western economies, where they could try to work illegally or claim asylum. However, many of these transit migrants, most with illegal or irregular status, thwarted at entry to the west, may become permanent residents. Furthermore, the CEE countries, in preparing to re-enter mainstream Europe of the Council of Europe and the EU, were obliged to accede to the Geneva Conventions during the 1990s, and so for the first time these countries have started generating statistics on asylum claimants and refugees (OECD, 2003). That will reinforce these new

TABLE 4
Population stocks - citizens from Central and Eastern Europe in selected OECD countries (2000)
and all foreign citizens in selected UNECE countries (thousands and per cent)

	Citizenship						Birthplace	
	Austria (workers)	Germany	Italy	Netherlands 1999	Sweden	Switzerland	Canada	United States
All foreign as per cent total pop.	242.2	7 296.8	1 388.2	651.5	477.3	1 384.4	4 971.1	19 767.3
UNECE nationals as per cent foreign pop.	58.5	19.9	11.7	3.7	15.3	24.5	10.4	5.7
All foreign as per cent total pop.	10.5	8.9	2.4	4.1	5.4	19.3	17.4	7.9
UNECE nationals as per cent total pop.	6.1	1.8	0.3	0.1	0.8	4.7	1.8	0.4

	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia
	Total foreign population	101.0	204.7	128.4	39.4	69.5
Per cent of total population	1.2	2	1.3	0.1	0.3	0.5

Source: OECD 2003, table 1.24, table 1.25.

Note: These totals will be considerably understated by naturalisation in the case of western countries, and by non-registration of illegal immigrants in both but especially in the UNECE countries.

and unexpected flows of displaced persons and refugees from similar origins. Once settled, further growth can be expected with the arrival of dependants, spouses and new partners.

Estimates of the likely long-term added inflow from new accession countries to the EU arising from the free movement provisions are very mixed. For example Fertig and Schmidt (2001) made astonishingly precise predictions of between 66,740 to 73,583 immigrants to Germany per year from the CEEC-10 EU accession countries³ countries from 1995-2015. Other estimates range between 20,000 and 200,000 per year. The official view from the European Commission (2001; and Boeri and Bucker, 2000) is that enlargement will lead to an eventual migration of about 3 million from the new accession countries (plus Bulgaria and Romania when they eventually join). Another study suggested that, without transitional restrictions, between 4 and 5 million would eventually migrate to Germany alone over 15 years from all the CEE countries. Salt et al. (1999) concluded that it was impossible to quantify the scale of future immigration, but that the most likely figure lay between the broad margins of 55,000 and 278,000 per year from all the accession states to the rest of the EU - the latter being a substantial increase in present flow. The higher of these figures is in line with the cumulative totals cited above. However, the poor economic and integration situation in the Euro zone in 2003 prompted most member states to impose a staged block on free CEE migration for up to 7 years. A bigger flow than expected, therefore, may move to the United Kingdom and to the Republic of Ireland, the only remaining countries that continue to offer immediate access (however the United Kingdom government has been at

pains to emphasise that only workers are welcome). Early data from the United Kingdom suggests a net inflow of about 4,000 new immigrants per month, considerably higher on an annualised basis than the government projection of between 4,000 and 13,000 but lower than other estimates.

Parallels between this migration and that from Southern Europe in the 1980s are not appropriate. Once free movement from Spain, Portugal and Greece was eventually permitted, inflows from those countries were modest. But they had already had a previous major guest-worker migration in the 1950s and 1960s. Their GDPs per capita, about 50 per cent of the EU average in the 1960s, had risen to 75 per cent by the time the migration restrictions were lifted. By then many of the guest-workers were returning home and migration pressures had disappeared. None of this true in the CEE countries, where per capita Gross National Income is still just under half the EU level (47 per cent) on a purchasing power parity basis (World Bank, 2002; European Commission, 2003). In addition there are large and unproductive agricultural populations and - with the exception of Poland - guest-worker migration is still at an earlier stage. Unemployment in the new accession countries is even higher than in the Euro zone, in Q4 2002 being 18 per cent in Poland, 17 per cent in Slovakia, 9 per cent in the Czech Republic and 8 per cent in Hungary (UNECE, 2003, table 3.4.2).

The demographic effect of migration – immigrant, foreign and ethnic minority populations in 2000

About 175 million people throughout the world now live in a country that was not their birthplace (United Nations, 2002). Of these, about 106 million live in the

³ Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

'developed world': 56 million in Europe (8.5 per cent of population), 46 million in the countries of the English-speaking world overseas (13.8 per cent, most of them – 35 million – in the United States) and 4 million in the Asian industrial countries. The 'European' figure of 56 million, however, is misleadingly high. It includes over 24 million residents of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Most of these were born in other republics of the former Soviet Union, very few from outside its borders. Until 1992 few would have been classified as having been born in a foreign country. The events of 1992 transformed their status overnight into that of foreigner.

In about 2001, Europe west of the former Iron Curtain had the largest number of immigrants of any region of Europe; that is persons born abroad (18.8 million) and the highest proportion relative to population (10.3 per cent). France and Germany had 6 and 7 million respectively, about 10 per cent of the population, the same as in the Netherlands (1.6 million). That is almost as high as the proportion of immigrants in the United States (12.4 per cent). In Switzerland and in the small population of Luxemburg, over 20 per cent were born abroad, about the same as in the countries of the English-speaking world overseas (e.g. Canada 19 per cent) (table 5).

In Northern Europe, demographically dominated by the United Kingdom, the foreign-born population comprises a slightly smaller proportion of the total at 7.8 per cent. Latvia and Estonia have much higher proportions as a result of planned 'Russification' in Soviet times. The rise of the foreign-born population in the Republic of Ireland to 8 per cent is new; a proportion of those are returned expatriates of Irish origin.

These data on birthplace ignore citizenship. Most immigrants are foreign citizens. Returning citizens, or those entitled by ancestry to citizenship form only a small

part. East European *aussiedler* of (often remote) German origin, mentioned above, have moved to West Germany in large numbers since the Basic Law established their entitlement under the *jus sanguinis*: 2.3 million from 1987 to 1996. Their return peaked as recently as 1992 and is continuing (105,000 in 1999). They are not included in statistics of the foreign population but they are included in the statistics on naturalisation. The Southern European countries share similarly low proportions of immigrant population according to official figures. However the 2-5 per cent reported for Italy, Portugal and Spain conceal a large number of illegal residents.

Citizenship and naturalisation

Citizenship is the usual indicator of immigrant status in continental Europe, and a misleading one, in both directions. Naturalisation makes foreigners disappear, often in large numbers. It accounts for the apparent absurdity of the decline in the foreign population in France from 1982 (3.71 million) to 1999 (3.26 million), in the Netherlands from 1990 (692,400) to 1999 (651,500) and in Belgium over the same period. It might be argued that this is only appropriate, as foreigners acquire new citizenship by having shown a commitment to and knowledge of their new homeland. This transubstantiation, however, may be very partial, especially in those countries where naturalisation is seen not as a reward for assimilation to the local culture but rather as a mechanism to encourage integration. Naturalisation has been powerful in reducing the apparent size of the foreign population (table 6). In Europe in the mid-1990s, the proportion of foreign-born population who had not acquired host country citizenship had fallen to 48 per cent in the Netherlands while remaining as high as 92 per cent in Denmark.

The broader net effect of international migration -

TABLE 5

Foreign population 1971-2001 (thousands and per cent)

	1971		1981		1991		2001	
	Thousands	Per cent	Thousands	Per cent	Thousands	Per cent	Thousands	Per cent
Austria	195	2.6	288	3.8	439	5.7	761	9.4
Belgium	663	6.9	861	8.7	905	9.1	862	8.4
Denmark	100	2.0	102	2.0	161	3.1	259	4.8
France	3 714	6.9	3 608	6.3	3 342	5.8
Germany	3 054	3.9	4 453	5.7	5 343	6.7	7 297	8.9
Italy	122	0.2	211	0.4	566	1.0	1 271	2.2
Netherlands	247	1.9	521	3.7	692	4.6	668	4.2
Norway	76	2.0	83	2.0	143	3.4	184	4.1
Spain	148	0.4	183	0.5	279	0.7	896	2.2
Sweden	411	5.1	422	5.1	484	5.6	477	5.4
Switzerland	1 080	17.4	915	14.4	1 130	16.7	1 424	19.8
United Kingdom	1 638	2.9	1 892	3.3	2 580	4.4
Total	6 097		13 390		15 641		20 020	

Source: Council of Europe 2002, table 1.8 and Eurostat 2002.

Note: Data source: Labour Force Survey, France, Greece, Portugal, United Kingdom (2001 data); Italy (2000 data).

TABLE 6
Foreign and immigrant population compared, mid-1990s

		Population (millions)	Born abroad (thousands)	Born abroad (per cent)	Foreign nationality		Foreign as per cent of immigrant pop..
					(thousands)	(per cent)	
Denmark	1996	5.236	259.2	5.0	237.7	4.5	91.7
Netherlands	1995	15.531	1 407.1	9.1	679.9	4.4	48.3
Norway	1996	4.381	246.9	5.6	157.5	3.6	63.8
Sweden	1996	4.381	246.9	5.6	157.5	3.6	63.8
United Kingdom	1991	54.889	3 746.1	6.8	1 791.0	3.3	47.8

Source: OECD 1998, table B.1.5, table B.1.6; Council of Europe 1998; United Nations 2002.

the growth of the immigrant-descended population - would be reflected by citizenship statistics if the children of foreign immigrants likewise retained the foreign citizenship of their parents. This is apparent in the statistics from Austria, Switzerland and Germany where, until recently at least, naturalisation of foreign citizens was not easy. That would give an estimate analogous to that of the 'ethnic' population categories used in the English-speaking world including the United Kingdom, but avoided elsewhere in Europe, with the partial exception of the Netherlands.

Growth of immigrant and minority populations

Many immigrant ethnic minority populations come from countries with incomplete fertility transitions. The combination of immigration and high fertility, allied to a youthful age structure, has generated rapid growth. In 1951, the United Kingdom ethnic minority population, judging from birth-place data, is likely to have been below 50,000. By 1971 it had grown to 1.4 million and by 2002 to 4.7 million, with an annual growth rate during the 1990s of 2.9 per cent. In 2001, over half were born in the United Kingdom and the rest, including most adults and heads of household, were born abroad. In the United States the most dramatic growth has been that of the Hispanic population. Most are of recent immigrant origin. When the 'Hispanic' category was first introduced into the United States census questionnaire in 1970, 9.1 million were enumerated (4.5 per cent). By 2000 this had grown to 35.3 million (12.5 per cent of the total population), with the biggest ever increment (57.9 per cent) occurring in the last intercensal period between 1990 and 2000 (US Census Bureau, 2001b), an annual rate of 4.5 per cent per year. This growth arose mostly through immigration even though the Hispanic TFR is almost 50 per cent higher (2.95) than the United States average (2.03). The Asian population, entirely of immigrant origin, grew from 6.9 million, (2.8 per cent) in 1990 to 10.2 million (3.6 per cent) in 2000 (US Census Bureau, 2002). In the 2000 census 63.1 million people identified themselves as belonging to a non-white racial group (22.4 per cent of the total population). An additional 6.8 million people (2.4 per cent) claimed


descent from two or more races; this left about 75 per cent 'white and other' (US Census Bureau, 2001a; Goldstein and Morning, 2002). In the United Kingdom, 18.7 per cent of the ethnic minority population aged 0-15 in 2000 was of mixed origin, mostly white / Caribbean. (Coleman and Smith, in preparation).

Current levels of immigration into many western countries, together with the relatively higher rates of increase of some populations of immigrant origin, are transforming the structures and compositions of those societies. Population projections of foreign-origin or ethnic minority populations are available only for a few countries (figure 18). They show a striking similarity in the rate of increase of the ethnic or foreign-origin population, to reach between 20 and 30 per cent of the total population by mid-century and for the most part still increasing rapidly. The foreign-origin populations here include foreigners of western origin as well as non-western: these comprise about half the starting total in the case of the Netherlands, for example. The number of these 'western' immigrants is projected to increase only slightly before stabilising or declining. The native population of the countries concerned are projected to remain static or decline over the same period. In most of the projections, higher immigrant birth rates are assumed to converge towards those of the general population. It is continued immigration that makes the difference. Variant projections with zero net migration assumptions show only modest further increases in foreign populations (figure 19). If immigration to the developed world continues at recent levels, however, the ethnic and social composition of the population of many European countries, as well as that of the United States, will be radically and permanently transformed.

Concluding remarks

This paper has covered a wide area and does not address a single thesis. These concluding remarks will address a small selection of topics, and attempt to bring together some of the themes discussed above.

FIGURE 18
 Projected growth of population of foreign origin, 2000-2050 as per cent of population



Source: Alders (2001a,b); US Census Bureau (1996); Think Tank on Integration in Denmark (2002); Ulrich (2001).

The turbulence created by the political and economic upheaval in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s remains the biggest demographic event of the past 15 years.

At the beginning of 1990 the huge impact of the collapse of communism in 1989 was only just becoming apparent, the demise of the Soviet Union was still to come, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had not yet broken up, and Germany was not yet unified. These areas have seen profound demographic upheavals and the jury is still out on what the final outcome will be. Certainly the relative uniformity in the demographic, social and political spheres which characterised the communist bloc in 1990 has been shattered and its component populations are moving apart in divergent directions; some to a prosperity and stability which has taken them into the EU, albeit with some holding of breath; others still languishing in a post-communist economic, political and social *tristesse* of persistent high mortality, lowest-low birth rates and actual, not just prospective, population decline.


Further West, international migration has dominated European population dynamics, often in unexpected ways. While the great Soviet outflow did not materialise, the Yugoslav catastrophe forced two million to move, pushing migration to a peak in 1992 from which it receded only to increase once more following the more resistible rise of globalised asylum-seeking. Perceptions

have changed and changed again. Migration, whose rapid rise in the early part of the decade provoked unprecedented across-party cooperation in Germany to stem it, lives under two parallel and incompatible pressures. Elite opinion, and in Germany and the United Kingdom current government policy, favours more migration to promote the economy and gives high priority to preserving the principle of asylum. Mass opinion in Europe, and some political parties in opposition (Germany) and in government (Denmark) increasingly opposes it, as communities change visibly under its impact, and for fear of the threat that it poses to employment and working conditions.

In terms of public and political perception, the 1990s were the decade of population ageing, as media, governments and pension systems finally woke up to the long-heralded prospect of the unsustainability and insolvency of their retirement and pension arrangements with respect to the labour market. Never has the discipline of demography enjoyed such favour from the media, even if its reward is to be vulgarised as 'demographics'. Fads have come and gone. The concept of 'replacement migration' to prevent population ageing was shown by the UNPD to involve immigration and population growth levels implausible even to the most enthusiastic (United Nations, 2001). Yet these hypothetical calculations were taken as necessary prescriptions by serious politicians. Saner counsels have now abandoned those wilder shores of demography.

FIGURE 19

Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000 - 2050 as per cent of total population, with zero net migration



Source: Alders 2001a,b, United States Census Bureau, 1996; Think Tank on Integration in Denmark, 2002; Ulrich 2001.

However some governments, mostly English-speaking, cling to the notion that immigration offers economic - if not demographic - salvation and have promoted it to record levels in the last few years. Meanwhile most of Europe tries to moderate flows, except those of the highly skilled.

The conceptual landscape in demography has changed radically. The Second Demographic Transition maintains its progress. The trends that it describes have become more prevalent in the developed world and more popular as a scientific paradigm. Only formulated in 1987 to account for the rise of cohabitation, divorce and illegitimacy amidst the ebbing of marriage, this concept has seen its predictions of the globalisation of such behaviour in the modern world at least partly vindicated. In gaining wide acceptance, it has promoted a whole new industry of demographic research based on ideational change as the driving force. New techniques have been developed for the analysis of the life course, for the 'correction' of period fertility measures, for probabilistic population projection, for the integration of macro- and micro-scale effects, and these have transformed the analytical landscape. Accordingly, demography has become much more complicated in the 1990s. We know much more about the workings and relationships of the component parts of population processes. But their future remains unknown territory.

In the meantime, Europe has been radically rearranged. The fall of the Iron Curtain, the collapse of

the Soviet empire, and the break up of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have greatly increased the number of European countries, even while Europe's overall population is on the edge of decline. Only one has disappeared, East Germany, being swallowed by the Federal Republic. Fortunately the communist sub-national republics had a good history of vital statistics. The new rearrangement of European countries by the UN may make geographic sense but it has created some very heterogeneous regions, as Northern and Southern Europe⁴ have both acquired new and relatively poor former communist members. The Russian republics of the Soviet Union, formerly a bloc unto themselves, now join Europe, taking its population to 728 million in 2000 and its boundaries from Reykjavik to Vladivostok.

Convergence and divergence in the UNECE area

We might ask if any tendency is apparent for the diverse populations of the UNECE area to converge on a common demographic pattern. So far the answer appears to be rather little (Coleman, 2002a). Neither is it regarded as being inevitable (De Beer and Van Wissen,

⁴ Countries of Northern Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Irish Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom.

Countries of Southern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (micro-states and dependencies omitted).

1999). Modern countries maintain long-standing differences of many kinds. These include political systems and electoral preferences, national characteristics of various kinds (Inkeles and Masamichi, 1996), values and attitudes (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Whether welfare institutions, which may have important demographic effects, are converging remains controversial (Greve, 1994; Gauthier, 2002; Tomka, 2003). One striking example of non-convergence is the persistence of large differentials in standardised mortality rates from accidents and violence in 31 industrial countries; this is especially true for traffic accidents, despite nearly identical cars being driven, comparable standards of road and signs, the use of seat belts, laws against drink-driving and so on (Chesnais, 2003). If symmetrical gender equity is an important determinant of fertility levels (McDonald, 2000), then convergence may indeed be slow, as such a change in the fundamental relations between men and women would require a major cultural transformation in Southern and probably also in Eastern Europe.

In Eastern Europe, their unique political system had put these populations under unnatural constraints for decades (see Lutz, Scherbov and Volkov, 1994, part III; Meslé et al., 1996). These constraints have driven them off the trajectory of improvement in survival which would have been expected earlier in the 20th century. On top of that is the post-1990 rise in the death rate in many (though not all) of the countries in transition. The convergence imposed by communism has given way to centripetal forces taking the former communist bloc in different directions, often to a demographic position closer to their geographical neighbours; for example Slovenia is leaving behind its 'Balkan' characteristics and coming to resemble somewhat its Austrian neighbour.

The achievement of low mortality in the west is far from uniform. Despite the triumphs of oldest old survival, mortality is not improving everywhere. An early group of low mortality achievers - the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, for example - have failed to make much recent progress, and none at all among Danish women. The statistical mediocrity of survival in very successful economies such as that of Germany, with its high expenditure on medical services, suggests that further convergence cannot be expected simply on economic grounds. Models of economic inequality (Wilkinson, 1996) compete with dietary hypotheses. The superior survival of the populations of the 'olive oil belt' of poorer Southern Europe compared with the richer 'sausage, beer and chips belt' of Northern Europe confounds economic explanation of mortality differentials. The nutritional hypothesis receives further support from the relatively low mortality since the 1960s in such poor former communist countries as Albania (Gjonça et al., 1997) and FYR Macedonia, which follow a Mediterranean dietary regime.

It may be that the 20th century saw so many upheavals that a forecast into the 21st century is beyond the reach of theory; the turbulence created in the 1990s has unhelpfully muddied the demographic waters. The expectation for the future must be one of constrained variety, more in some areas than others. Past trends may be some guide, in that some demographic characteristics do seem to be geographically clustered. Some salient demographic characteristics today connect with the particularities of the past (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000), for example the familism and household patterns of Southern Europe (Reher, 1998) and the Scandinavian history of births outside marriage, now shared by Estonia. The ancient division of Europe by Hajnal's line, which outlasted the Ottoman and Russian Empires, and was if anything reinforced by the Soviet one, looks as though it will not survive the end of the Iron Curtain.

The demographic consequences of the EU and its expansion

In the same decade that the communist block collapsed, the European Union made exceptional gains in acquiring additional countries as member states and additional power over policies, which indirectly, if not directly, affect fertility, migration and health. Likely consequences include the convergence of family-formation and family-building behaviour under the influence of increasingly common welfare and entitlement policies. The EU Commission believes that EU demographic and other social characteristics are already converging (European Commission, 1995) and will need similar policy responses (Hantrais, 1997) as a result. Demographic convergence is already regarded as one indicator of a desirable harmonisation of European social conditions. Although so far no European Directive relating to standard European birth rates, death rates or household structure has been formulated, the possibility of harmonised EU demographic optima has already been raised (Gesano, 1999). Since the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere meeting, migration and asylum policy has moved away from the responsibility of member states to Community competence. A Europe-wide migration policy has been proposed (European Commission, 2000) despite the very diverse demographic and workforce conditions of different European states (Coleman, 2002a). The Cohesion Fund and the Structural Fund are intended to accelerate the removal of economic inequalities in the EU area, between and within countries; other things being equal that must be expected to make family formation patterns more uniform.

However, if the economic problems of the Euro zone continue, the overall economic effects may not be favourable upon families. Furthermore the effects of EU fiscal and competition rules on the new accession countries may, at least in the short run, be disruptive to at least some areas of their economy, especially agriculture and 'Rust Belt' industries. The example of the former

East Germany in the nearly fifteen years after unification in 1990 is not encouraging from the viewpoint of economic or of demographic recovery. Nonetheless some wish to see the expansion of the EU to embrace the more fragile economies and unsettled political systems of the Balkans and even of Turkey. In that case its boundaries would include an even greater share of the population of the Eastern sector of the UNECE region. The goals of harmonising the economic and social institutions of the member states, and thereby - indirectly at least - the behaviour of its populations, would become less easy to realise. Demographic diversity in Europe will be with us for some time.

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