

CHAPTER 3

WORK-FAMILY BALANCE AND CHILDBEARING INTENTIONS IN FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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1 - INTRODUCTION

In the 1970s and 1980s, one of the main explanations for the fall in fertility was the rise in women's paid employment (Rindfuss et al., 1996). Among OECD¹⁰ member countries, those with the highest fertility were those where the rate of female employment was lowest. Difficulties in balancing work and family responsibilities and the cultural reluctance of mothers to be active in the labour market often led women to opt between working and having children (or a large number of children). Even so, in the mid-1980s the correlation between fertility and women's economic activity, which had been negative, became positive at the macro-economic level (Ahn and Mira 2002, Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2002)¹¹. It is now rather those countries where women's presence in the labour market is high that display the highest fertility rates (and vice versa). High female employment can be combined with relatively high fertility when policies facilitate the combination of paid work and parenthood (Bernhard 1993, Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).

This has led to a new way of addressing the relationship between fertility and economic activity, in both academic and political circles. In a context of fertility decline and the delay of parenthood nearly everywhere in Europe (Koehler et al. 2002, Sobotka 2004), academic and policy debate has focused on the definition of policy measures to stop the decrease in fertility. The dominant idea now is that policies that reduce the incompatibility of work and family life can affect fertility (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002). According to the OECD Employment Outlook 2001, "(The) work-family balance is also important for longer trends in population... It is plausible that improvement in the work-family balance could help to increase both the current employment rates and fertility rates" (OECD 2001). Policies to reconcile work and family life are also a major theme on the European agenda.

This shift in the relationship between paid work and fertility has come about against a background of major changes in the labour market. Since the mid-1980s, increasing economic instability and exposure

to international competition have caused a rise in labour productivity and flexibility (Ashkenazy et al. 2002). Many of these organizational changes make work more attractive, but at the cost of greater work intensity, diversified working hours and the development of professional versatility and atypical types of employment (Bué et al. 1999). At the same time, uncertainty in the labour market has grown and unemployment has persisted. We know that the timing of births can be influenced by employment stability (Meron and Widmer 2002). This development of more flexibility in employment status (including fewer long-term full-time jobs) and working hours (e.g. non-standard hours, more intense work) particularly affects women, who are mainly employed in the service sector.

This article looks at the relationship between fertility and, first, actions to reconcile work and family life and, secondly, the individual's status in the labour market. More specifically, it examines fertility intentions. On the hypothesis that fertility is planned and effectively controlled, these intentions may be seen as an indicator or predictor of behaviour, and therefore future fertility (Schoen et al. 1999). Factors influencing intentions may in turn influence fertility behaviour. We assess how occupational status and work-family policy may affect fertility intentions. It is assumed that fertility decisions are made with the consideration of people's current employment status and expected change after a birth, including work-family policy. Where these policies are advanced, women more often anticipate returning to work after a birth. The purpose of the research is to reveal whether the reproductive intentions and employment decisions are correlated, and to identify determinants of fertility decisions.

We examine fertility intentions for a specific period, namely the next three years. The aim is to study the desire for children vis-à-vis individuals' current constraints and opportunities. The choice of a fairly short period makes it more likely that responses will be realistic and can be used to measure probable behaviour. In addition, fertility intentions for a specific period are relatively good predictors of fertility (Williams et al. 1999).

We present a comparative analysis of three countries with quite different economic and institutional features: France, Germany and the Russian

¹⁰ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

¹¹ In the EU-15, this positive correlation between fertility and female employment is significant (0.53); it is rather lower in the EU-25 (0.43). The reason is that the correlation is slight but negative in the 10 countries that joined in 2004 (-.0027), which all have low fertility rates

Federation. The analysis uses data from the first panel wave of the Generation and Gender Survey, which are particularly useful for examining the effect of work-life reconciliation policy and employment insecurity connected with fertility intentions.

First, we briefly recapitulate the theories that connect fertility with employment. Second, we present the economic and institutional context of the three countries. Finally, we give the method and the results.

2 - THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Dominant theoretical framework

The dominant economic theory for fertility decisions belongs to neo-classical economics, or “new home economics” (Becker 1981). Each individual or household is assumed to possess the resources of time and money and to exchange them for goods and services (which they may enjoy now or later) in order to maximize their own well-being. Within this framework, the decision to have a child is a rational one, and parents balance the costs and benefits of children. The benefits include the child him- or herself and the guarantee he or she may represent for the parents’ old age. There are two types of cost: the direct costs of having children (caring for them, education costs, etc.) and the opportunity cost or income lost by withdrawing from the labour market to care for the child. This opportunity cost may be short-term, i.e. the income lost when leaving a job, and/or long-term, i.e. the missed career opportunities due to these interruptions (Bielby 1992). According to this theory, any reduction in the cost of children or any increase in income is expected to increase the demand for children (Becker 1981, Cigno 1991).

2.2. Company work-life policies

Family policy may affect the cost of children or the household’s income, and in this way influence the “demand” for children. For example, family allowances, tax reductions for children and payments for maternity or paternity leave compensate for the drop in income due to education expenses or mothers’ absence from the workplace. By reducing the cost of the child, these policies may have a positive effect on fertility.

Work-family life reconciliation policies may also affect costs. By reducing the “structural incompatibility” between work and family life (Liefbroer and Corijn 1999), they may cut the duration of absences from work and therefore the losses of income due to these absences. The availability of subsidized childcare arrangements, for example, enables mothers to go

on working. To be attractive, childcare services must be affordable, high quality and flexible in terms of opening hours.

Two players may operate such work-life policies: the State is one, naturally, but the other, increasingly involved, player is employers (OECD 2002–2005; EGGSIE 2005; den Dulk 2001). In recent years, employers have been encouraged to implement their own family-friendly policies in various countries. In France, for example, a “family tax credit” was introduced in 2004 with the aim of encouraging companies to provide childcare. Companies can act in two main areas: (a) the provision of childcare facilities and (b) the guarantee of flexible working time arrangements. However, childcare is hard to set up. For the employer, this is a complex matter, motivated by strong demand from employees and utility for the company (Daune-Richard et al. 2007). As we shall see, provision of childcare by employers remains rare.

Another lever for employers is working hours and holidays. By ensuring shorter hours for their employees, variable workweek arrangements, days off for unexpected events such as a child’s illness, etc., employers create a working environment that makes it possible to combine employment and family responsibilities. Note that this flexibility of working hours to help the work-family balance is a separate issue from the flexibility of employment status, labour costs or total working time, which employers often seek. It is by adapting working hours to employees’ constraints that a family-friendly environment is created.

2.3. Stability of employment

Another major explanation for the decline of fertility related to employment is the development of economic insecurity (Blossfeld et al. 2005; Mills and Blossfeld 2005). High economic uncertainty occurs in early adulthood, with high rates of youth unemployment and job instability. This economic insecurity is particularly noticeable in transition economies.

Employment instability is an important determinant of fertility choices. However, economic insecurity may have two opposite effects on fertility. Having a stable job may be a prerequisite for family formation. The development of short-term employment and unemployment may provide an incentive to delay decisions that involve long-term commitments such as childbearing. High unemployment among the young also reduces the opportunity cost of staying in education. When individuals arrive on the labour market with higher qualifications, the opportunity cost of having a child is also higher, which reduces fertility (Kohler et al., 2006). Economic conditions are thought to influence the opportunities for and constraints on having children that individuals and couples perceive, and also the expected costs and benefits of having children. In particular, the more uncertain one's socio-economic conditions, the higher one may perceive the cost of having children.

On the other hand, unemployment lowers the opportunity cost of children, and individuals facing difficulties on the labour market may decide to centre their lives on the private sphere (especially women) and to invest in children. Parenthood may provide certainty in life (Friedman et al., 1994) and may be desired, particularly if fertility is valued in society and by peers and relatives. In this case, unemployment would increase fertility, or at least accelerate it.

2.4. Previous empirical studies

The literature assessing the effects of reconciliation policies on fertility presents highly variable findings according to the institutional arrangements (see Gauthier 2007, for a survey of the literature). So the provision of childcare does have a positive effect on fertility, but only a slight one (Pasqua et al. 2005, Del Boca 2002, Kravdal 1996). It is not significant in Finland, Germany and Sweden (Hank and Kreyenfeld

2003, Rønsen 2004, Anderson et al. 2004). Similarly, findings differ as to the effect of parental leave on fertility. Some studies report a slight positive impact of parental leave, mainly because of a tempo effect (Rønsen 1999, 2004; Hoem 1993; Lalive and Zweimüller 2005; Büttner and Lutz 1990). Others report that completed family size is not affected (Hoem et al. 2001). Similarly, the availability of part-time work operates positively in Belgian Flanders, Italy and the Netherlands, (Liefbroer et al. 1999, Del Boca 2002) whereas the effect is negative in the United States (Budig 2003). On the other hand, existing research is in agreement on the fact that flexible working hours encourage fertility, whatever the institutional arrangements (Del Boca 2002, Bettio and Villa 1998, Castles 2003, Bernardi et al. 2007). In all, family-friendly policies have something of a positive effect on fertility. Castles (2003), for example, reveals a positive relationship between a composite indicator of family-friendly policies and the fertility rate in 21 OECD countries.

Here too, the institutional arrangements are a determining factor in the effect of unemployment or female non-employment on fertility. Unemployment delays the formation of a family in France (Meron and Widmer 2002), in Belgian Flanders (Impens 1989) and in Germany among the most highly qualified (Kreyenfeld, 2005). It has had a positive effect in Norway (Kravdal 1994). Studies of the effect on fertility of occupational instability and atypical employment mainly cover Southern European countries, where these types of employment are particularly developed. They confirm the hypothesis that fertility is postponed where employment is unstable (Ahn and Mira 2001, De la Rica and Iza 2005).

We will now examine how employment status and reconciliation policies may affect fertility intentions in three countries with differing welfare states.

3 - A COMPARATIVE STUDY

The Russian Federation, Germany and France were the largest countries by population in Europe in 2007¹², with 141.7, 82.3 and 61.7 million, respectively (Population Reference Bureau 2007). The three countries differ in their demographic and economic situations, the extent of female

participation in the labour market, their gender values and their policies for family support and help in reconciling work and family life.

Germany and the Russian Federation share very low fertility rates: their total fertility rates in 2005 were, respectively, 1.39 and 1.34 children per woman. This has been a long-term trend in Germany, where the fertility rate had already fallen below 1.5 in 1975

¹² The population of France is slightly higher than that of the United Kingdom and Italy

(Dorbritz 2008). The phenomenon is more recent in the Russian Federation, where the rapid fall in fertility began in the late 1980s¹³, a consequence of the deterioration in economic conditions and a more radical shift in attitudes to the family. Another difference is that Germany is one of the countries where the rate of childless women is one of the

¹³ The fertility rate was 2.23 children per woman in 1987

highest in the world, whereas this figure is low in France and the Russian Federation. The fertility rate in France is relatively high when compared with other European countries (1.94 in 2005). France and Germany share a relatively late and increasing age at first birth (Table 27). This age is lower in the Russian Federation, but the formation of the family, whether a couple or the first child, has been increasingly postponed since the late 1980s.

Table 27
Key figures for France, Germany and the Russian Federation

	France	Germany	Russian Federation
Total fertility rate	1.94	1.39	1.35
Mean age at first birth	27.7	28.2	24.0
GDP per capita	30,386	29,461	10,845
Unemployment rate (1996–2005)	9.8	11.1	7.8
Female participation rate (25–54) in 2003	79.3	77.8	74.6
Gender-related development index (rank)	7	22	58
Gender empowerment measure (rank)	18	28	71

Note: 2005 data, except when specified.

Source: GGP contextual database; Rosstat, EUROSTAT; INSEE; United Nations Human development report, 2006/2007

The three countries also have quite different living standards. France and Germany are among the countries with the highest per capita GDP (ranking 18 and 20 in the world in 2005), while the Russian Federation ranks lower (52). However, the unemployment rate is lower in the Russian Federation (an average of 7.8 per cent in the period 1996–2005, as compared with 9.8 per cent for France and 11.1 per cent for Germany).

The Russian Federation has a long tradition of female employment, which was ideologically supported in the Soviet Union: from the 1940s the overwhelming majority of women worked for pay at State enterprises or collective farms. In spite of a decline in female employment the transition to the post-Soviet era, the level of female participation is still high today. During the economic transformations, the rates of female economic activity and employment remained at quite high levels. In the Russian Federation in 2005, the labour force participation rate of the 15–72 population was 61.5 per cent, including 66.1 per cent of the male population and 57.5 per cent of the female. Of the population 16–54/59 years old, the percentage was 71.3, including 73.3 per cent of males aged

16–59 and 69.3 per cent of females aged 16–54. As male employment rates are lower in the Russian Federation than in many European countries, the difference between the employment rates of men and women is less than in many other countries (Katz 2008). The two-earner household is still the predominant norm, even if men are considered to be the primary breadwinners and women as second earners (Katz 2008). Furthermore, women's participation rate fell particularly rapidly for the mothers of preschool children during the transition period.

The activity rate of French adult women started to rise for cohorts born after the mid-1950s, and today most French women work. The level of female paid employment is high: in 2005, the activity rate of women aged 15–59 was 76.5 per cent¹⁴. This increase in women's labour force participation occurred irrespective of the number of children: from 1985 to 2002, it rose from 72 per cent to 84 per cent for women with one child, from 66 per cent to 80 per cent for women with two children

¹⁴ The female employment rate is lower than the activity rate, as the latter includes unemployed women (see below).

and from 45 per cent to 63 per cent for those with three children. Most women continue to work while having children; their employment is less often disrupted by childbearing than in other continental European countries. Nevertheless, motherhood is still associated with withdrawal from the labour market for some groups of women (Anxo et al. 2006, Pailhé and Solaz 2006). Working mothers of young children are socially well accepted, both by individuals and by firms, whereas the “housewife” model has become socially discredited. Attitudes towards female work have changed dramatically: according to CREDOC¹⁵ opinion surveys, in 1978, 41 per cent of French people thought that women should not work while their children were young. This figure fell to 17 per cent in 2004. More than 60 per cent think that women should have the free choice of working or not. So the dominant model is the two-career one: among couples aged 20–49 where at least one partner has a job, both partners have jobs in 70 per cent of cases; the man is the sole earner in 25 per cent of couples; and the woman is the sole earner in 5 per cent of couples (Eurostat, Labour Force Survey).

In Germany, women’s participation in the labour market is slightly lower than in France. Having a child affects the difference in participation between the two countries. The participation rate is higher for childless German women (figure X). On the other hand, women with children are more often economically inactive in Germany and many have part-time jobs (particularly in the old West Germany). The model of the wife as homemaker is still very popular, particularly in the West.

Women’s participation rate responds to economic imperatives, and also differing forms of family policy. German family policy is based on the traditional male breadwinner model. Women are largely forced to choose between family and work, and to leave the labour market when a child is born (Dorbritz 2008). Until 2006¹⁶, parental leave was strongly encouraged. It was granted irrespective of occupation before the birth, which makes it a sort of “maternal wage” for mothers’ domestic work and parenting. Some 75 per cent of German women take

this leave and 50 per cent stay at home until the child is three years old. There are very few facilities for the care of younger children. In the former West Germany, only 4 per cent of under-threes attend a public or private crèche, and 64 per cent of three-to-six-year-olds attend kindergartens. Although local authorities have been obliged since 1996 to provide every child with a place in a kindergarten, this objective has not been achieved, for both financial and ideological reasons. Furthermore, the opening hours of crèches, kindergartens and schools reduce mothers’ availability for full-time paid work. But family policy does include generous allowances.


Whereas German society has some misgivings about the early collective socialization of children, France has a long tradition of State action in this area. The State tends to stand in for families, with the aim of social equity as well as encouraging fertility (Rosental 2003). French family policy is a compromise between promoting families and promoting the work-family balance and women’s employment. For example, the whole policy used to be based on the male breadwinner and female caregiver pattern, but the development of kindergartens, introduced at the same time, was meant to promote equal opportunities among French children. Since the 1980s, this policy has accommodated the massive arrival of women on the labour market. Collective and private care arrangements were developed for children under three, helping women to reconcile family and work (Toulemon et al., 2008). Unlike in Northern European countries, this type of care is available immediately after the end of maternity leave, i.e. from the age of two or three months, and the hours are extensive: on weekdays from 7 or 8 a.m. to 6 or 7 p.m. In 1994, family policy came to a turning point. The family policy reform, adopted against a background of high unemployment, adopted the opposite philosophy, by creating incentives to leave the labour force. The allocation parentale d’éducation (APE) was designed to allow one of the parents (in practice, the mother) to devote themselves entirely to bringing up the newborn child until his or her third birthday. It is estimated that this leave has been an incentive to labour force withdrawal for a significant number of mothers, especially the less educated. Finally, according to a recent survey on childcare, on weekdays, 61 per cent of children under three are cared for mainly by their parents, 21 per cent by subsidized child-minders, 10 per cent in a crèche, 7 per cent by their

¹⁵ Centre de Recherche pour l’Etude et l’Observation des Conditions de Vie

¹⁶ Since 2006, a number of steps have been taken to develop childcare rather than parental leave, e.g. the possibility of deducting childcare expenses from taxable income

Figure X

Female labour force participation rate by number of children



Source: EUROSTAT, data 2005.

grand-parents or family and 1 per cent by nannies at home (Blanpain 2006, Ruault and Daniel 2003). Thirty-seven per cent of children aged 2, 97 per cent of children at age 3 were enrolled in écoles maternelles (kindergartens), and although this is not compulsory (Blanpain 2006). In summary, France has created a favourable context for reconciling work and family by relatively comprehensive and continuous support through a combination of subsidized private and public providers, parental leave and allowances.

In the Russian Federation, public expenditure on the family was severely cut back during the transition period (Ovcharova and Popova 2005)¹⁷. The level of allowances is very low, has not been indexed on inflation and has not taken account of the increasing cost of childbearing. Parental leave is paid for children under 18 months, but at a fairly low rate (40 per cent of average mother's salary, up to 6,000 roubles a month (€160–180)). Additional parental leave is available until the child is 3, but it is not paid. The provision of childcare facilities also deteriorated during the transition period.


¹⁷ According to the estimates of Ovcharova and Popova (2005), the share of family and maternity benefits in all State funds directed to payment of social benefits decreased from 77.3 per cent in 1991 to 32.4 per cent in 2003e

The proportion of children aged 1–6 in crèches or kindergartens fell from 66 per cent in 1990 to 58 per cent in 1998 and 54 per cent in 2003. The number of children on waiting lists for preschool institutions was four times higher in 2004 than in 1999 (Goskomstat 1999, 2004).

The three countries also differ markedly in company practices for reconciling work and family life. The provision of childcare by companies is relatively sparse in all three (figure XI). It is slightly higher in the Russian Federation, a relic of the communist period (11 per cent of employees work in companies that provide childcare). More employees in France enjoy flexible working hours (44 per cent) than in the Russian Federation and Germany (29 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively; see figure 2). However, part-time work for women is fairly developed in Germany and very rare in the Russian Federation.


As seen above, the formal provision of childcare is more highly developed in France than in the other two countries. Among parents of young children, 38 per cent receive formal childcare support in France as compared with 31 per cent in Germany and 28 per cent in the Russian Federation. Informal provision is also more developed in France

Figure XI A
Provision of childcare and time arrangements by companies



Source: GGS, wave 1.
Sample: Wage earners

Figure XI B
Provision of childcare and time arrangements by companies



Source: GGS, wave 1.

4 - METHOD

4.1. Data and sample

The data used come from wave 1 of the Gender and Generation Survey, carried out in the Russian Federation in 2004 and France and Germany in 2005, with people aged 18–79. The survey, coordinated by the Population Unit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, examines determining factors for individual demographic behaviour, with a focus on intergenerational and gender relations. It is a multidisciplinary survey, covering economic, sociological and psychological factors (Vikat et al. 2007). In addition to its retrospective view of behaviour, the survey includes a prospective approach, and for this reason it will comprise three waves. Not only is a wide spectrum of dimensions studied, but the survey presents the advantage of enabling comparison between countries. The questionnaire was designed by an international group of researchers, and each country was supposed to use the standard questionnaire.

Much of the questionnaire concerns fertility, seen both retrospectively and prospectively. The precise timing of births is recorded and a number of questions address fertility intentions. The survey question we have used is the following: “Do you intend to have a/another child during the next three years?” Four responses were possible: definitely yes, probably yes, probably not and definitely not.

The question was asked of men and women under 50, regardless of whether they were living as a couple. It was filtered for people certain of being infertile (or whose spouse was). The French questionnaire was slightly different in structure. To avoid redundancy, this question was filtered for those who had earlier stated that they did not want any children at all ; we assumed the response “definitely not” for the respondents thus filtered. We compared these intentions with occupational status. Sections 8 and 9 of the questionnaire address the detailed occupational situation of the respondent and their spouse. The population of reference used was men and women aged 18–45. The upper age limit was lowered to 45 because the likelihood that older women would have fertility intentions is very slight in these three countries. The research covers people living as a couple (whether married or not, cohabiting or not). This selection was made in order to have the most realistic intentions possible and to

prevent the statement being affected by prospects of forming a couple in the next three years.

The literature has for a long time mainly addressed women’s fertility intentions, on the underlying assumption that women are the main drivers of fertility. However, it is not only women’s characteristics but also men’s that may influence fertility intentions (Mills et al., 2008). It is instructive to examine men’s fertility intentions and to see whether occupational status operates in the same way for men and women. Furthermore, we analysed how a spouse’s occupational status affects a person’s intentions. Qualitative research into intentions has shown that individuals integrate their spouse’s position in the formulation of their intentions (Bernardi et al. 2007). We examined whether the inclusion of the spouse’s characteristics modifies the effect of an individual’s characteristics. The sample sizes are given in table 28.

Table 28
Sample size

	France	Germany	Russian Federation
Women	1 896	1 242	1 904
Men	1 307	845	1 415

4.2. Dependent variables and statistical method

The dependent variable is constructed from the response to the question about intentions of having a child in the next three years. “Definitely not” and “probably not” were taken together as negative responses, and “definitely yes” and “probably yes” as positive.

We analysed the intentions of having a/another child in the next three years using a series of logistic regressions. As considerations that affect the decision to have the first child differ from those that affect the following births, we estimated a first model for childless men and childless women respectively, and then a second model for mothers and fathers. Men and women are analysed separately, since the determinants of intentions for men and women differ because the job characteristic effect on intentions is likely to differ by gender (we also tested that it is significantly different).

4.3. Explanatory variables and specific sample

The variables of interest here are of two sorts: (a) stability of employment, and consequently of occupational status, and (b) work-family policies in a particular job.

The various types of occupational status used in model 1 are as follows: student, not working or inactive, permanently employed, temporarily employed or on parental leave (for intentions of having a further child). Model 2 adds a variable indicating whether the spouse is unemployed. The sample used for the estimates is the full sample of people between 18 and 45 living as couples in each country.

The indicators of work-family policies used in model 3 are as follows: (a) the possibility of having flexible work arrangements; (b) having a part-time contract; and (c) availability of childcare provided by the workplace (own or partner's workplace). In the model relating to those who already have children, two variables are added for the use of formal or informal childcare arrangements. The regressions apply to the population of those in paid work.

4.4 Control variables

In addition to the variables of interest described above, we control for a set of socio-demographic variables that have been shown to correlate to fertility intentions: these relate to the respondent's age and the age difference between spouses. Marital status is included, since in some countries marriage is related to parenthood. For parents, the number of children and the age of the youngest are added.

Certain economic variables are included, namely educational qualifications (below secondary, secondary completed and higher than secondary) and housing conditions. Satisfaction with current accommodation is measured on a scale of 1 to 10. Variables relating to type of employment are included in the specification of work-family policies: public or private sector, and occupation. Public employees have more secure and protected jobs than private employees and jobs in the public sector more often have the opportunity of flexible work arrangements.

An indicator of more traditional values is included, namely religious attendance. The more religious are more likely to want children. A person is considered to be religious if they attend a religious service at least 12 times a year. Lastly, the number of the respondent's own siblings is a good indicator of a desire for children (Axinn et al. 1994).

5 - RESULTS

5.1. Descriptive statistics

Responses regarding fertility intentions vary according to whether or not respondents already have children (table 29), which confirms the need to examine separately the issues of first parenthood and extending the family. Childless women express fairly high fertility intentions. However, the distribution of those who intend to have children in the next three years varies considerably between countries. More than half of childless women in France and the Russian Federation wish to have a child, but only 38 per cent in Germany. This desire is particularly strong in the Russian Federation, where more than 6 out of 10 childless women express it. Differences between countries are less marked for women who already have children. Those in France are the most numerous in expressing a fertility intention. Differences between countries can also be found among men, who in each country are less

numerous than women in wanting a child when they do not already have one, and slightly more numerous than women when they do.

One survey question concerns the relationship between fertility intentions and the availability of childcare. It emerges that the possibility of having childcare is a key factor in fertility intentions among men and women (figure XII), particularly in the Russian Federation and Germany (46 per cent and 34 per cent of childless women, respectively, consider that this is a major factor in their intentions of having a child). This concern about childcare persists among women with children in the Russian Federation. It is of slightly less importance for men than for women. There is also a negative correlation between the concern for the availability of childcare and stated intentions: those most concerned about childcare express the lowest fertility intentions.

Table 29
Fertility intentions among men and women

Men	Childless			With children		
	France	Germany	Russian Federation	France	Germany	Russian Federation
Definitely yes	26.5	14.1	22.9	12.1	6.0	6.8
Probably yes	21.2	20.7	31.5	11.7	9.5	17.9
Probably not	17.5	20.5	22.0	3.9	10.0	21.8
Definitely not	34.8	44.8	23.6	72.3	74.5	53.5

Women	Childless			With children		
	France	Germany	Russian Federation	France	Germany	Russian Federation
Definitely yes	28.9	20.1	28.5	12.2	7.6	5.2
Probably yes	22.9	18.3	33.9	10.1	6.8	13.6
Probably not	17.0	19.8	19.2	3.7	11.3	20.8
Definitely not	31.2	41.8	18.5	74.0	74.3	60.4

Source: GGS, Wave 1

5.2. Work stability

Table 30 presents the results of the regressions for childless men and women. Model 1 only includes variables relating to the respondent, and model 2 includes a variable relating to the spouse's occupational status. The full results are given in tables 33–35.

The effect of occupational status varies among the three countries. Women with less stable jobs have lower fertility intentions in France and Germany. In these countries, the hypothesis that people postpone fertility because of the instability of their employment appears to be confirmed: women wait to have a permanent job before thinking of having children. Similarly, in France, being unemployed has a negative effect on the fertility intentions of childless women.


In the Russian Federation, however, having a temporary job or being unemployed increases fertility intentions. This result may confirm the hypothesis of a withdrawal into the world of the family due to economic difficulties in that country. Another interpretation would be the particular nature of temporary jobs in the Russian Federation. These jobs are mainly found in new private-sector companies. They may be much better paying than

permanent jobs in the public sector. The income effect may be positive for fertility intentions, and young women more often have these types of jobs. These jobs are also more frequent in small companies, which offer little guarantee of continued employment in the case of pregnancy or after a birth. The higher fertility intentions may in practice reflect past intentions that were unfulfilled because of employment constraints. Women with permanent jobs in major State enterprises or the public sector which do guarantee continued employment in the case of pregnancy, can fulfil their intentions when they wish. This is similar to the interpretation given by Sinyavskaya et al. (2007) concerning women with university degrees, who have fewer children than others; they delay childbearing decisions more than less qualified women, but they express higher fertility intentions than other groups.

The spouse's occupational status affects childless women's fertility intentions in France and the Russian Federation. In these countries, if the spouse is not working, this reduces women's fertility intentions. In Germany, however, the spouse's occupational status does not have an effect and only the woman's status appears to be a factor. The addition of the spouse's occupational status variable makes the parameter of the woman's occupational status non-

Figure XII A


Relationship between availability of childcare and fertility decisions. Women



Source: GGS, wave 1.

Figure XII B

Relationship between availability of childcare and fertility decisions. Men



Source: GGS, wave 1.

Table 30

Regression results for intention for a first child by work stability

	Women			Men		
	France	Germany	Russian Federation	France	Germany	Russian Federation
Non permanent job	–	–	(+)	ns	ns	ns
Permanent job	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref
Unemployed or out of the labour force (OLF)	(–)	ns	(+)	(–)	ns	–
Student	–	–	ns	–	–	–
Non-working partner	–	ns	–	–	ns	ns
N	619	301	323	411	348	358

Source: GGS, wave 1.

Legend:

+: Positive statistically significant influence

–: Negative statistically significant influence

(): The level of significance varies depending on the introduction of partner's employment status

ns: not significant at the 10% level

ref: reference group

significant in France, showing that it is more the man's unemployment that affects intentions than the woman's.

Among men, being unemployed has a negative effect on intentions for first parenthood in France and the Russian Federation. However, having a temporary job has none. Their partner's occupational status has no effect, except in France, where men reduce their fertility intentions if their spouse is not working. Frenchmen appear to have realized that their spouses want to have a stable job before having a child.

Although occupational status affects intentions for a first child, it does not affect intentions of having children after the first one. All the coefficients are non-significant. Employment status affects entry into parenthood, but has no effect on the intention to have another child. It may also be explained by the fewer unstable jobs and lower unemployment status of people having children. For women in the Russian Federation, having an unemployed partner continues to negatively impact intentions to have a further child, which shows that the man's economic situation is a determining factor in that country.

5.3. Family-friendly policies

Table 31 presents the effects of family-friendly policies on fertility intentions. The regressions cover employed persons and are calculated from a pooled sample, with the addition of country indicators. This provides a sufficient number for assessing the effect of those family-friendly policies that concern only a small number of employees (e.g. childcare by employer).

The effect of family-friendly policies on fertility intentions is less clear than that of employment status. Flexibility in working hours does have some positive effect on the intention to have a first child, but significance levels are low. A separate analysis by country shows that flexibility in working hours is only significant in Germany. The limited opening hours of crèches and schools in that country may explain this positive effect of informal agreements on time schedule on fertility intentions. On the other hand, having a part-time job reduces fertility plans of childless women and men. This may be explained by the wide diversity of part-time jobs. As proposed by an employer, these jobs are often non-permanent with irregular, split-shift hours.

Table 31

Regression results for intention for a further child by work stability

	Women			Men		
	France	Germany	Russian Federation	France	Germany	Russian Federation
Non permanent job	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	+
Permanent job	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref
Unemployed	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Out of the labour force or student	ns	ns	ns			
Parental leave	ns	ns	ns			
Non-working partner	ns	ns	–	ns	ns	ns
N	1277	941	1581	896	497	1057

Source: GGS, wave 1.

Legend:

- +: Positive statistically significant influence
- : Negative statistically significant influence
- ns: not significant at the 10% level
- ref: reference group

Table 32

Regression results for intention for a child by family-friendly policy

	Childless		With children	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Flexible work schedule	(+)	ns	ns	ns
Part-time	–	–	ns	ns
Childcare by employer	+	+	ns	+
Institutional childcare			ns	ns
Informal childcare			–	ns
N	1190	1241	4332	3529

Source: GGS, wave 1.

Legend:

- +: Positive statistically significant influence
- : Negative statistically significant influence
- (): The level of significance varies depending on the introduction of partner's employment status
- ns: not significant at the 10% level

When it is the employee who seeks such a job, it is more transitional and the employee has a greater choice of hours. In the case of the childless, these jobs are more likely a way of increasing flexibility for employers than a way to achieve a better work-family balance. Childcare by the employer has a positive effect on intentions to have a first child, among both men and women. This relatively rare facility does therefore encourage fertility. It thus seems perceived as a good way to balance family and work. In the case of women, it does not affect their intentions to have a further child, however. It may be that it is not so much the possibility of a place in a crèche that is important as actually gaining a place. Moreover, access to formal childcare does not significantly affect the intention to have another child.

Intentions to have a first child depend on the status in the labour market and, to a lesser extent, on actions of firms to reconcile family and work. Intentions to have another child depend to a larger extent on demographic and cultural factors. They depend strongly on the number of children: having two children is still positive in terms of fertility intentions in France and to a lesser extent in Germany, while one child seems the optimal size in the Russian Federation. Other demographic factors, such as age and the age gap between spouses, have also a strong effect on fertility plans. Norms and familial heritage also have a significant effect on intentions to have additional children. Thus, religiosity and the number of siblings act positively on fertility plans. Having a larger family depend also on the type of job hold, which may be a proxy of income.

6 - CONCLUSIONS

The results show that insecure employment has a negative effect on the desire among women for a first child in France and Germany, but a positive one in the Russian Federation. The effect is negative for men. However, the effect of employment instability disappears with respect to the intention to have a further child. This may be an age effect: unstable jobs and unemployment mainly affect the young when they enter the labour market.

Family-friendly policies have a less clear effect on fertility intentions, and here too it is mainly on the intention to have a first child. The weak effects observed with regards to the intention to have a further child may be due to (a) the limitation of the sample to women with a job or (b) the fact that they have achieved the desired family size. However, the results show that childcare provided by the employer

does have a positive effect on intentions. Flexible hours have little effect, except in Germany, where they are sought because school and kindergarten hours are highly inflexible. The weak effects may also be due to the diversity of policies practised.

Intentions may change over time and may also not be achieved (Monnier 1989, Morgan 2003). It is consequently useful to examine the factors that mean that the intentions are not achieved or change. The data from GGS wave 2 will enable us to study various behaviours, in particular in the transition between first and subsequent children. We shall then see whether fertility intentions are achieved, whether there is a gap between intentions and reality, and whether employment status and family-friendly policies affect the achievement of these intentions.

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APPENDIX

Tables 33

Regression results for intention for a child by work stability

Table 33-A

France, childless people

	Childless women				Childless men			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Religious	-0.403	-0.91	-0.380	-0.85	0.607	1.12	0.889	1.61
French nationality	-0.061	-0.12	-0.081	-0.16	-0.225	-0.42	-0.163	-0.30
Number of siblings	0.175 ***	2.91	0.175 ***	2.89	0.045	0.69	0.056	0.84
Age								
< 25	-1.074 ***	-2.93	-1.001 ***	-2.72	-1.981 ***	-4.83	-1.791 ***	-4.28
25–29	-0.031	-0.08	-0.017	-0.04	-0.832 **	-2.28	-0.815**	-2.19
30–34 (ref)								
35–39	-1.119 *	-2.43	-1.067 **	-2.31	-1.997 ***	-4.11	-2.125***	-4.30
40 +	-3.037 ***	-6.00	-2.962 ***	-5.83	-2.135 ***	-4.19	-2.257***	-4.37
Married	0.959 ***	3.09	0.922 ***	2.97	0.588 *	1.73	0.557*	1.64
Education								
Primary education	-0.789 ***	-2.22	-0.751 ***	-2.09	0.174	0.41	0.241	0.55
Secondary education	-0.230	-1.12	-0.212	-1.02	0.623 **	2.39	0.655***	2.47
Tertiary education (ref)								
Job								
Temporary job	-0.480 *	-1.80	-0.450 *	-1.68	-0.131	-0.38	0.040	0.11
Stable job (ref)								
Unemployed	-0.570 *	-1.74	-0.484	-1.46	-0.805 **	-2.18	-0.597	-1.57
Student	-1.591 ***	-5.82	-1.413 ***	-5.01	-1.625 ***	-3.75	-1.158***	-2.53
Non-working partner			-0.620 ***	-2.54			-0.971***	-3.57
Quality of housing	-0.038	-0.68	-0.051	-0.88	-0.026	-0.42	-0.028	-0.46
Age difference								
Men 2 years + younger	1.107 *	1.92	1.079 *	1.89	-0.152	-0.39	-0.182	-0.47
Same age (ref)								
Women 2 years + younger	0.017	0.09	-0.065	-0.33	-0.080	-0.31	0.091	0.34
Intercept	1.516 **	2.02	1.691 **	2.22	1.433 *	1.86	1.510*	1.92
N	619		619		411		411	
Pseudo R²	21.3		22.0		17.9		20.2	

Table 33-B
France, people with children

	Women with children				Men with children			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Religious	0.395	1.30	0.386	1.27	0.890**	2.40	0.901**	2.43
French nationality	-0.002	-0.01	-0.015	-0.05	-0.484	-1.41	-0.486	-1.41
Number of siblings	0.109***	2.90	0.109***	2.90	0.015	0.30	0.015	0.32
Age								
<25	0.032	0.08	0.042	0.11	-2.023**	-2.28	-1.988**	-2.23
25–29	0.676***	2.55	0.675***	2.55	0.348	1.00	0.373	1.07
30–34 (<i>ref</i>)								
35–39	-0.801***	-3.64	-0.805***	-3.66	-0.723***	-2.88	-0.727***	-2.89
40+	-2.053***	-6.12	-2.053***	-6.11	-0.998***	-2.94	-1.014***	-2.99
Number of children								
1 child	2.808***	9.44	2.804***	9.42	2.546***	7.88	2.515***	7.74
2 children	1.065***	3.89	1.062***	3.88	0.576*	1.91	0.545*	1.80
3 children + (<i>ref</i>)								
Age of youngest child	-0.090***	-3.50	-0.089***	-3.47	-0.221***	-6.31	-0.223***	-6.34
Married	0.069	0.37	0.069	0.37	0.071	0.32	0.060	0.26
Education								
Primary education	-0.276	-0.94	-0.268	-0.91	-0.445	-1.38	-0.413	-1.27
Secondary education	-0.300	-1.52	-0.299	-1.52	-0.677***	-2.90	-0.667***	-2.84
Tertiary education (<i>ref</i>)								
Job								
Temporary job	0.474	1.57	0.483	1.60	0.421	1.16	0.417	1.15
Stable job (<i>ref</i>)								
Unemployed	0.388	1.30	0.418	1.37	0.353	0.95	0.363	0.98
OLF/student	0.283	1.03	0.285	1.04				
Parental leave	-0.046	-0.14	-0.048	-0.15				
Non-working partner			-0.159	-0.46			-0.193	-0.85
Quality of housing	-0.036	-0.80	-0.040	-0.87	-0.004	-0.07	-0.009	-0.16
Age difference								
Men 2 years + younger	0.716**	2.07	0.721**	2.09	0.016	0.05	0.030	0.09
Same age (<i>ref</i>)								
Women 2 years +younger	-0.289	-1.62	-0.283	-1.59	0.346	1.50	0.366	1.58
Intercept	-1.651***	-2.79	-1.607***	-2.68	-0.408	-0.60	-0.289	-0.41
N	1277		1277		896		896	
Pseudo R²	31.9		32.0		34.4		34.5	

Table 33-C
Russian Federation, childless people

	Childless women				Childless Men			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Religious	0.335	0.90	0.313	0.83	0.102	0.23	0.083	0.18
Number of siblings	0.046	0.36	0.048	0.38	-0.012	-0.12	-0.007	-0.08
Age								
< 25	-1.125*	-1.70	-1.073	-1.61	0.622	1.52	0.715*	1.69
25–29	-0.806	-1.19	-0.834	-1.22	1.464***	3.37	1.493***	3.41
30–34 (<i>ref</i>)								
35–39	-1.621**	-1.97	-1.534*	-1.84	0.501	0.90	0.514	0.92
40 +	-3.821***	-3.72	-3.886***	-3.75	-1.246**	-2.10	-1.255**	-2.10
Married	0.881**	2.39	0.842***	2.27	0.726**	2.28	0.721**	2.26
Education								
Primary education	-0.799*	-1.72	-0.836*	-1.78	-0.407	-1.02	-0.431	-1.08
Secondary education	-0.010	-0.03	-0.012	-0.04	-0.107	-0.39	-0.102	-0.37
Tertiary education (<i>ref</i>)								
Job								
Temporary job	0.611	1.60	0.704*	1.81	-0.064	-0.21	-0.036	-0.12
Stable job (<i>ref</i>)								
Unemployed	0.663	1.60	0.707*	1.70	-0.553	-1.43	-0.518	-1.33
Student	-0.567	-1.62	-0.368	-1.00	-1.096***	-2.89	-1.005***	-2.58
Non-working partner			-0.681**	-1.99			-0.277	-1.03
Quality of housing	-0.074	-1.61	-0.068	-1.47	-0.097**	-2.14	-0.099**	-2.19
Age difference								
Men 2 years + younger	0.508	0.69	0.479	0.64	-0.332	-0.86	-0.356	-0.92
Same age (<i>ref</i>)								
Women 2 years + younger	0.280	1.03	0.144	0.51	0.869***	2.95	0.919***	3.07
Intercept	1.724**	2.41	1.827***	2.53	0.197	0.36	0.235	0.43
N	321		321		357		357	
Pseudo R²	11.2		12.1		15.4		15.6	

Table 33-D
Russian Federation, people with children

	Women with children				Men with children			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Religious	0.464**	2.00	0.450*	1.93	0.789***	2.71	0.774***	2.65
Number of siblings	-0.048	-0.74	-0.044	-0.68	0.224***	4.12	0.218***	3.99
Age								
<25	0.356	1.24	0.346	1.20	-0.676*	-1.77	-0.738*	-1.92
25–29	0.581***	2.79	0.558***	2.67	-0.269	-1.11	-0.296	-1.21
30–34 (ref)								
35–39	-1.277***	-4.67	-1.298***	-4.73	-0.926***	-3.90	-0.925***	-3.89
40+	-1.884***	-5.49	-1.896***	-5.50	-2.051***	-6.74	-2.058***	-6.76
Married	-0.186	-1.06	-0.197	-1.13	-0.366*	-1.77	-0.356*	-1.72
Number of children								
1 child	2.037***	3.32	2.002***	3.26	1.455***	4.00	1.480***	4.06
2 children	0.102	0.16	0.054	0.09	-0.298	-0.79	-0.278	-0.73
3 children + (ref)								
Age of youngest child	0.009	0.40	0.009	0.39	-0.003	-0.12	-0.001	-0.04
Education								
Primary education	-0.379	-1.39	-0.373	-1.36	-0.574**	-2.36	-0.579**	-2.37
Secondary education	-0.195	-1.16	-0.176	-1.04	-0.547***	-2.87	-0.552***	-2.88
Tertiary education (ref)								
Job								
Temporary job	0.219	1.00	0.215	0.98	0.501***	2.74	0.504***	2.75
Stable job (ref)								
Unemployed	-0.314	-0.87	-0.295	-0.81	0.220	0.75	0.186	0.63
OLF/student	-0.014	-0.06	-0.017	-0.08				
Parental leave	-0.303	-1.19	-0.320	-1.25				
Non-working partner			-0.495*	-1.87			0.298	1.48
Quality of housing	0.055**	2.09	0.055**	2.06	0.002	0.08	0.004	0.14
Age difference								
Men 2 years + younger	0.279	0.98	0.273	0.95	-0.595*	-1.86	-0.590*	-1.85
Same age (ref)								
Women 2 years + younger	-0.336**	-2.12	-0.329**	-2.07	0.522***	2.93	0.506***	2.83
Intercept	-2.492***	-3.65	-2.398***	-3.50	-1.208***	-2.45	-1.289***	-2.59
N	1577		1577		1055		1055	
Pseudo R²	24.8		25.0		20.9		21.1	

Table 33-E
Germany, childless people

	Childless women				Childless men			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Religious	0.241	0.57	0.208	0.49	0.647	1.56	0.657	1.59
German nationality	-0.381	-1.00	-0.370	-0.97	0.074	0.18	0.046	0.11
Number of siblings	0.095	0.89	0.104	0.96	0.215**	1.99	0.218**	2.01
Age								
< 25	-0.534	-1.21	-0.485	-1.09	-0.640	-1.58	-0.490	-1.15
25–29	0.312	0.71	0.332	0.75	0.035	0.09	0.102	0.26
30–34 (<i>ref</i>)								
35–39	-1.832***	-3.23	-1.829***	-3.21	-0.891*	-1.91	-0.918**	-1.96
40+	-4.529***	-4.11	-4.530***	-4.10	-2.088***	-4.16	-2.097***	-4.17
Married	1.160***	3.02	1.135***	2.95	0.695*	1.93	0.680*	1.90
Education								
Primary education	0.068	0.13	0.063	0.12	-1.492***	-2.47	-1.427***	-2.36
Secondary education	-0.395	-1.12	-0.391	-1.11	-0.628**	-2.02	-0.592**	-1.89
Tertiary education (<i>ref</i>)								
Job								
Temporary job	-0.913**	-2.16	-0.896**	-2.11	-0.211	-0.66	-0.177	-0.54
Stable job (<i>ref</i>)								
Unemployed	-0.338	-0.77	-0.328	-0.74	-0.329	-0.83	-0.285	-0.71
Student	-1.353***	-3.03	-1.259***	-2.76	-1.901***	-4.28	-1.794***	-3.96
Non-working partner			-0.328	-0.97			-0.353	-1.16
Quality of housing	-0.095	-1.57	-0.093	-1.54	-0.037	-0.64	-0.035	-0.61
Age difference								
Men 2 years + younger	-0.977	-1.36	-0.946	-1.32	0.266	0.60	0.244	0.55
Same age (<i>ref</i>)								
Women 2 years + younger	-0.414	-1.45	-0.467	-1.60	0.768***	2.76	0.806***	2.86
Intercept	1.584**	2.02	1.616**	2.06	0.137	0.18	0.158	0.21
N	301		301		348		348	
Pseudo R²	20.3		20.5		17.0		17.3	

Table 33-F
Germany, people with children

	Women with Children				Men with Children			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Religious	0.991***	3.30	0.960***	3.19	-0.043	-0.09	-0.038	-0.08
German nationality	-0.192	-0.67	-0.218	-0.76	-1.024***	-2.53	-1.031**	-2.54
Number of siblings	0.059	0.80	0.069	0.92	0.048	0.51	0.051	0.53
Age								
<25	-1.019**	-2.19	-0.929**	-1.97	0.575	0.72	0.596	0.74
25–29	-0.137	-0.44	-0.118	-0.38	1.064**	2.07	1.071**	2.08
30–34 (<i>ref</i>)								
35–39	-1.159***	-3.55	-1.180***	-3.61	-0.810*	-1.86	-0.808*	-1.85
40+	-2.549***	-4.51	-2.591***	-4.56	-1.334***	-2.57	-1.343***	-2.58
Number of children								
1 child	2.834***	5.75	2.839***	5.78	3.488***	3.99	3.481***	3.98
2 children	0.898*	1.87	0.890*	1.86	1.409*	1.64	1.406	1.63
3 children + (<i>ref</i>)								
Age of youngest child	-0.158***	-3.92	-0.156***	-3.87	-0.213***	-3.87	-0.215***	-3.84
Married	-0.124	-0.39	-0.184	-0.57	0.952*	1.73	0.966*	1.74
Education								
Primary education	-0.584	-1.45	-0.570	-1.41	-0.244	-0.40	-0.240	-0.40
Secondary education	-0.773**	-2.77	-0.801***	-2.85	-0.817**	-2.15	-0.822**	-2.16
Tertiary education (<i>ref</i>)								
Job								
Temporary job	0.270	0.73	0.280	0.75	0.154	0.34	0.157	0.35
Stable job (<i>ref</i>)								
Unemployed	0.379	0.72	0.466	0.88	0.081	0.16	0.079	0.15
OLF/student	0.212	0.67	0.247	0.77				
Parental leave	0.326	0.92	0.328	0.93				
Non-working partner			-0.477	-1.25			-0.069	-0.19
Quality of housing	-0.028	-0.55	-0.029	-0.56	0.080	1.12	0.079	1.12
Age difference								
Men 2 years + younger	0.688	1.34	0.747	1.45	-0.232	-0.34	-0.235	-0.35
Same age (<i>ref</i>)								
Women 2 years + younger	-0.057	-0.24	-0.061	-0.25	0.081	0.23	0.086	0.24
Intercept	-1.446*	-1.84	-1.346*	-1.71	-3.071**	-2.41	-3.034**	-2.35
N	941		941		497		497	
Pseudo R²	34.0		34.2		40.5		40.5	

Table 34

Regression results for intention for a first child by family-friendly policy (logit)

	Working men without children		Working women without children	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Country				
<i>France (ref)</i>				
Russia	0.465***	2.63	0.087	0.49
Germany	-0.507***	-2.70	-0.920***	-4.96
Religious	0.394	1.62	0.224	1.02
Number of siblings	0.186***	3.88	0.100**	1.99
Age				
<25	-0.666***	-3.43	-0.898***	-4.12
25–29	0.171	0.89	-0.165	-0.74
<i>30–34 (ref)</i>				
35–39	-0.900***	-3.71	-1.533***	-5.60
40+	-1.855***	-7.55	-3.394***	-9.26
Married	0.588***	3.69	0.721***	4.04
Education				
Primary education	-0.724***	-2.91	-0.282	-1.06
Secondary education	-0.156	-1.05	-0.291*	-1.83
<i>Tertiary education (ref)</i>				
Part-time	-0.776***	-2.67	-0.466***	-2.43
Working schedule flexibility	-0.008	-0.06	0.211	1.50
Workplace crèche	0.617***	2.41	0.417*	1.65
Public	0.127	0.82	0.034	0.22
Profession				
<i>Highly skilled (ref)</i>				
Clerk	0.342*	1.73	0.182	0.91
Worker	-0.403**	-1.87	0.281	1.29
Farmer and other status	0.067	0.33	0.161	0.57
Intercept	0.259	1.01	1.022***	3.72
N	1241		1190	
Pseudo R²	12.7		16.2	

Table 35
Regression results for intention for a another child by family-friendly policy (logit)

	Working men with children		Working women with children	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Country				
<i>France (ref)</i>				
Russian Federation	-0.030	-0.21	-0.770***	-5.10
Germany	-0.619***	-3.65	-0.843***	-5.32
Religious	0.651***	4.19	0.502***	3.37
Number of siblings	0.139***	5.10	0.053	1.60
Age				
<25	-1.496***	-6.05	-0.247	-1.15
25–29	-0.315**	-2.18	0.307**	2.34
<i>30–34 (ref)</i>				
35–39	-0.813***	-6.37	-1.022***	-7.42
40+	-1.591***	-9.84	-1.873***	-9.84
Married	-0.308***	-2.56	-0.138	-1.26
Number of children				
1 child	2.105***	10.62	-1.951***	-15.63
2 children	0.204	1.03	-2.307***	-9.67
<i>3 children + (ref)</i>				
Age of youngest child	-0.086***	-6.50	-0.078***	-5.44
Education				
Primary education	-0.183	-1.11	-0.311	-1.57
Secondary education	-0.507***	-4.01	-0.155	-1.31
<i>Tertiary education (ref)</i>				
Part-time	-0.214	-0.63	0.055	0.43
Working schedule flexibility	0.127	1.21	0.086	0.82
Workplace crèche	0.452***	2.86	0.133	0.81
Public	-0.191*	-1.70	-0.110	-0.92
Profession				
<i>Highly skilled profession (ref)</i>				
Clerk	-0.138	-0.86	-0.332***	-2.55
Worker	-0.049	-0.28	-0.202	-1.46
Farmer and other status	-0.248*	-1.64	-0.355**	-2.04
Regular help with childcare	0.054	0.50	0.079	0.72
Informal help	0.078	0.75	-0.319***	-3.05
Intercept	-0.816***	-2.97	1.414***	6.10
N	3529		4332	
Pseudo R²	24.7		28.9	